Monday, July 5, 2010

WHAT IS IT ABOUT CIVIL SOCIETY? [3]

New Avenues of Inquiry
These observations do not close the question. If we are to retrieve what is most useful from the civil society argument, we must pursue [End Page 48] nagging empirical questions about the ways in which social power is constituted, distributed, and managed in contemporary societies. One avenue, suggested by the doubts that we have uncovered at the center of the civil society argument, would be to inquire more deeply into the sorts of associational life likely to produce the "social capital" on which Putnam has put so much weight. Sweeping, mutually exclusive ideal types like "political society" and "economic society," the "public," "private," and "nonprofit" sectors, and even "civil society" itself are unlikely to capture the range of associational forms that prepare citizens to engage in collective action for mutual benefit. The role of less formal but more numerous groups, moreover, needs to be taken into account in any such analysis.[27] We are likely to find that social-movement organizations, grassroots interest groups, and grassroots political associations of all sorts are far more likely to generate Putnam's activated citizenry than the choral societies, bird watching clubs, and bowling leagues he is so fond of citing.

A second avenue of inquiry might start with the demography of "social capital" production in different societies, seeking clues about the ways in which the larger political context shapes the relations between civil society and the state. If the argument developed here is correct, the key to the success or failure of democratic institutions will lie not in the character of civil society but in their responsiveness as institutions--in their ability to mediate conflict by hearing, channeling, and mediating the multiple citizen demands that modern societies express through civil and political associations alike.

Finally, the civil society argument raises intriguing and pressing questions about the nature and political import of the relations that associations of all sorts might forge with the state and with one another. What is the sense, for instance, and what is the nonsense in the frequent demand that civil associations be "nonpartisan"? How might civil society act to advance citizens' interests in the absence of effective political representation, and what are the limits to such action? Is there a viable distinction between the multiple "special interests" of civil society and the "public interest"? If there is, how and by whom shall this public interest be safeguarded? Where civil associations are closely tied to parties, what sorts of relations between them are conducive to greater internal democracy and fuller representation of citizens' interests? Is greater intraparty democracy (and therefore openness to "civil society") correlated with democratic governance, or is there no very clear relationship between the two? And if not, just how might vigorous representation of the interests and demands of civil society be reconciled with the norms of compromise and accommodation that govern political settlements? These are classic questions of political philosophy, but they are also empirical questions that the civil society argument, however faulty as a general account of democratic governance, forces upon us. [End Page 49] Such questions cannot be answered in the abstract but only through careful empirical work.

Notes
1. Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London: Verso, 1992), 89­107.

2. Most important are "religious special-purpose groups," which tend to be relatively small organizations formed to fulfill specialized functions often oriented toward the reform of a larger religious body or society as a whole. Such groups have a long history in the United States, but their numbers and membership seem to have grown tremendously in recent decades. For detailed analysis see Robert Wuthnow, "The Growth of Religious Reform Movements," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 480 (July 1985): 106­16; and The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

3. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). Olson's argument is but the most ambitious of attacks on the "rent-seeking" behavior of our "interest-group society" emanating from the public-choice school of political economy.

4. Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6 (January 1995): 65­78; and Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

5. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 173 and 176.

6. Putnam elaborates the argument in his 1995 Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture, where he focuses on explaining "the strange disappearance of social capital in America." See "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political Science and Politics 28 (December 1995): 664­83.

7. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 167­75.

8. There are, in fact, what statistical analysis describes as "ecological correlation problems" with Putnam's data interpretation in some instances (see William S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review 15 [1950]: 351­57). The co-occurrence of civic associations and effective government in the same region does not demonstrate that the people in the associations are the ones making the government work. To address that question, one must systematically introduce a mediating level of analysis that can demonstrate the actual avenues of influence among civically engaged people, civic associations, and institutional performance. Were the civic organizations party-organized, however, it would be easier to demonstrate the links among party membership, associating in party civic associations, parties, interest articulation or aggregation, and institutional performance. In fact, parties apparently play an important role in northern Italy's civic life.

9. As Putnam puts it in a more recent article, "To the extent that the norms, networks, and trust link substantial sectors of the community and span underlying social cleavages--to the extent that the social capital is of a `bridging' sort--then the enhanced cooperation is likely to serve broader interests and be widely welcomed." See "Tuning In, Tuning Out," 665.

10. Ted Perlmutter, "Italy: Why No Voluntary Sector?" in Robert Wuthnow, ed., Between States and Markets: The Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 157.

11. Aleksander Smolar, "From Opposition to Atomization," Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 26. Václav Havel continues to represent this stance, characterized by a discourse that is primarily moral. See Václav Havel and Václav Klaus, with commentary by Petr Pithart, "Rival Visions," Journal of Democracy
7 (January 1996): 12­23.

12. For a striking look at the advantages--and dangers--of political alignment for social organizations, see Cathy Lisa Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet's Chile (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). Schneider shows that Chilean Communist Party socialization in shantytowns that it controlled to significantly higher levels of social organization, community solidarity, and protest than elsewhere, but that the militancy of these towns, and the Party's isolation once it turned to armed struggle, left them broken by repression and without political resources after Chile's limited democratic transition.

13. To our knowledge, the proliferation of social-movement and citizen-advocacy organizations was first discussed by John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald in The Trends of Social Movements in America (Morristown, Pa.: General Learning Press, 1973) and demonstrated empirically in the case of Washington-based groups by David King and Jack L. Walker, Jr., "An Ecology of Interest Groups in America," in Jack L. Walker, Jr., ed., Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 57­75; and for women's and racial- or ethnic- advocacy groups generally by Debra Mink off, Organizing for Equality: The Evolution of Women's and Race-Ethnic Organizations in America, 1955­1985 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995). For similar accounts of nonprofit groups see P.D. Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992) and Michael O'Neill, The Third America: The Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector in the United States (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1989).

14. Only about one in four of these national groups is based in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. See John C. Brainard, ed., The Directory of National Environmental Organizations, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: Environmental Directories, 1992).

15. Topsfield Foundation, Grassroots Peace Directory (Pomfret, Conn.: no pub., 1987); Brainard, ed., Directory of National Environmental Organizations; Myra Marx Ferree and Patricia Yancy Martin, eds., Feminist Organizations: Harvest of the New Women's Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1995).

16. Putnam dismisses thousands of community-based nonprofit service organizations in similar fashion by equating their potential for producing "social capital" with that of the Ford Foundation, the Mayo Clinic, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Only if the tremendous growth in the "nonprofit sector" over recent decades were attributable primarily to growth among the large national-level groups specifically mentioned by Putnam would his assessment of the sector as a whole be well founded. His argument appears to be on sounder footing in "Tuning In, Tuning Out," where he appeals to evidence from a variety of national studies, including the General Social Survey, to show that participation in organizations has been declining since the late 1960s. Nevertheless, the use of participation in general as a stand-in for "social capital" makes even this data questionable, as Putnam himself argues that "who benefits from these connections, norms, and trust--the individual, the wider community, or some faction within the community--must be determined empirically, not definitionally" (p. 665)--essentially the point we make below.

17. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Doubleday, 1969), 193, 524, and 192. It is curious that Larry Diamond, in his synthesis of ideas on the role of civil society in democratic consolidation, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 5 (July 1994): 8, should quote the "free schools" passage as referring to civil, rather than political, associations. Like Putnam, Diamond wishes to exclude political parties from "civil  society," and he would dole out similar treatment to civil associations that refuse to be "civil" in their behavior (p. 11).

18. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 190­91.

19. Larry Diamond, more explicitly than Putnam, would simply exclude from "civil society" those groups whose ends or behavior might threaten democratic governance. See Diamond, "Rethinking," 11. Such an expedient makes the civil society argument nicely circular, and it denies us the opportunity to understand how real societies work.

20. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

21. Others solve this dilemma by positing conditions that must be met for civil society to work its magic. Groups must be "moderate" and restrained in their demands; they should be democratic themselves or at least support democracy; they should be institutionalized and have a stake in the system; they should not
reinforce social cleavages, but cut across them; and so on. The circularity of such condition-setting should be apparent.

22. There appears to be no relation, for example, between the changes in the character of Italian regional politics and politicians that Putnam's research uncovered and the "civicness" of the regions. Rather, Putnam ascribes the increased moderation and efficacy that he found to the new institutions (the regional governments), not to the civic culture in which some of them were embedded. The increased responsiveness of government represented by the new institutions was the key to their success, though Putnam shows that success varied in character and degree from region to region.

23. There are, of course, versions of the civil society argument in which social movements and social activists play a central role. Michael Walzer's article, cited in note 1 above, is one of them. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, in Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), present an extensively elaborated version. In neither case, however, do the authors take sufficiently seriously the difficulty of divided or "dangerous" civil societies.

24. There is generally a close correlation between individual participation in any association and broader civic engagement; see Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase, Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979). Nonetheless, it seems likely that specifically political associations (whether social-movement organizations, interest groups, or political parties) are more conducive to promoting civic engagement than many other sorts of association. That would certainly be in keeping with Tocqueville's argument. Like many other aspects of the civil society argument, however, it remains an intriguing empirical question.

25. Walzer, "Civil Society Argument," 102­3. See also Diamond, "Rethinking," 15­16.

26. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Huntington's notion of parties as necessary channels for political participation in modern and modernizing societies relied heavily on the ordering and controlling functions of parties. His favorite example, the Leninist communist parties of the time, proved a fickle choice, because they failed precisely to incorporate the responsiveness that makes successful democracies work but which Huntington systematically ignored in his account of the sort of "institutionalization" necessary to achieve political "order."

27. Given the social significance of bowling in the United States as documented in "Bowling Alone," informally organized groups of no league bowlers merit some consideration. On recent excursions to AMF East Carolina Bowl one of the authors of the present essay observed dozens of people bowling without benefit of league sponsorship. Contrary to Putnam's "whimsical, yet discomfiting" example, however, no one was bowling alone. 

Sunday, June 27, 2010

WHAT IS IT ABOUT CIVIL SOCIETY? [2]

The Political Variable
Proponents of the civil society argument cannot have it both ways. If civil society is to be "strong," it must be strong in defense of citizens' interests, whether those spring from "salient social cleavages" or mere personal taste.[19] Within the broader civil society argument, as we have seen, there seem to be two centers of gravity concerning civil society's relationship to the state and influence upon it. In both cases proponents of a strong civil sector emphasize its autonomy from partisan or electoral politics, though such autonomy is said to be crucial for opposite reasons. The version of the argument that we have called "Civil Society II" focuses on civil society as a counterweight to the state. In [End Page 45] contexts of democratic transition, in particular, where established political parties have been repressed, weakened, or used as tools by the authoritarian state, autonomy from traditional politics seems to be a prerequisite for oppositional advocacy. In such contexts, civil society is treated as an autonomous sphere of social power within which citizens can pressure authoritarians for change, protect themselves from tyranny, and democratize from below.

If civil society is a beachhead secure enough to be of use in thwarting tyrannical regimes, what prevents it from being used to undermine democratic governments? To the extent that civil associations are strong, they challenge governing institutions to meet particular needs, aspirations, and conceptions of the common good. Established interests may lock up social resources and block society's ability to meet the demands of the dispossessed (as in the southern United States up to the advent of the civil rights movement in the 1960s); social blocs may form, each with its own panoply of associations, to battle one another for control of the state (as in contemporary Lebanon or the "plural states" of Western Europe before the political settlements of the nineteenth century); political forces may forge powerful ties with community organizations and civil associations, polarizing society and at times threatening the "order" that incumbents so cherish (as in post World War II Italy and contemporary El Salvador). To understand the role of civil society in the modern world, we must discern how and under what circumstances a society's organized components contribute to political strength or political failure.

Like the analysts of the "Civil Society II" camp, however, Robert Putnam wants to make generalizations about civil society as a whole and under any circumstances. In his analyses of Italy and the United States, Putnam argues that civil society augments, rather than offsets, the state's capacity to govern. Consistent with the "Civil Society I" argument, Putnam focuses attention on the cultural and organizational benefits that citizen participation in civil associations holds for a democratic state. Implicit in his account, however, is the fear that if such associations follow too closely the pattern of divisive political solidarities, they may well sharpen social cleavages and actually undermine the capacity for effective governance. Consequently, he appears reluctant to count among his "civil associations" any that advance a cause, pursue policy change as their central vocation, or provoke conflict. In so doing Putnam, too, seems to want it both ways. He clearly wants an activated and engaged populace, and he argues that the socialization performed by civil associations is vital to the creation of such an engaged citizenry. Yet in the end only those associations qualify that invoke a civic transcendence whose spirit claims to "rise above" the divisiveness of protracted sociopolitical and cultural conflict. This solution to the dilemma threatens to render the argument circular, but it is troubling in more [End Page 46] than theory, for it seems to fly in the face of Putnam's own evidence and of the experience of Western democracies with social movements. Indeed, the arguments presented by Sidney Tarrow and by Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens make a forceful case for viewing social movements--that is to say, the organized mobilization of groups along social cleavages--as the central bearers of democratizing pressures within Western democracies.[20]

Our purpose here is not to repeat those arguments. Instead, we maintain that the civil society argument as it is commonly presented is partial at best and seriously misleading at worst. In many respects, it presupposes precisely the sort of political peace that it imagines civil society providing. Where emphasis is placed on the ability of civil society to oppose a tyrannical state, its ability to oppose a democratic one is either ignored outright or countered with qualifications that themselves undermine the power of the civil society argument gener-ally.[21] When emphasis is placed on the formation of "habits of the heart" conducive to cooperation and collective action, as it is in Robert Putnam's argument, the mechanisms by which such "microsocial" effects translate into "macropolitical" outcomes are weakly specified or contradictory or both. [22]

What is missing in both cases is the political variable. At a minimum, this "political variable" must include both the political associations that play important roles in any society and the work of political compromise, restraint, and accommodation necessary for reconciling competing interests in a peaceful and more or less orderly way. More generally, the political variable includes the prevailing "political settlement" that governs who plays, the rules of the game, and acceptable outcomes. Numerous examples from recent history show that such settlements are the work of political parties and of the best-financed, and often best-armed, elements of civil society.

The arrangements forged in such political settlements do not come easily, and when they do come they may well represent a betrayal of the trust that civil society placed in politicians and political parties, and in a deliberate or circumstantial dampening of social demands and expectations, as many of the recent experiments in "democratization" demonstrate. Here social movements may play a crucial role, and not only in "new" democracies, by taking up neglected or repressed demands and pushing the political system to engage forgotten or marginalized sectors and issues. [End Page 47]

That role, of course, is by no means unambiguous, any more than is that of the rest of civil society.[23] Social movements may represent an armed and paranoiac vision of civic responsibility (the militia movement in the United States is an example) or a retreat from social responsibility beyond the immediate group (as in the case of certain religious movements). Their efforts may start or break down in violence as frustration mounts in the face of an unresponsive political system or a repressive state. Yet they also build trust and habits of cooperation and civic action among their members. Where the political system is even minimally responsive, they can boost the vitality of civil and political society by mobilizing people and stimulating debate. In short, decidedly political associations may well play the roles attributed to civil associations in the civil society argument, and may play them better.[24]

What role organized groups in civil society will play, we would argue, depends crucially on the larger political setting. As Michael Walzer puts it, "there is no escape from power and coercion, no possibility of choosing, like the old anarchists, civil society alone." What Walzer calls "the paradox of the civil society argument" is that a democratic civil society seems to require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require a strong and responsive state. The strength and responsiveness of a democracy may depend upon the character of its civil society, as Putnam argues, reinforcing both the democratic functioning and the strength of  the state. But such effects depend on the prior achievement of both democracy and a strong state.[25]

Where the state is unresponsive, its institutions are undemocratic, or its democracy is ill designed to recognize and respond to citizen demands, the character of collective action will be decidedly different than under a strong and democratic system. Citizens will find their efforts to organize for civil ends frustrated by state policy--at some times actively repressed, at others simply ignored. Increasingly aggressive forms of civil association will spring up, and more and more ordinary citizens will be driven into either active militancy against the state or self-protective apathy. The breakdown of the tutelary democracies and authoritarian states of Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s attests to what more than one observer has euphemistically called "the dangers of excluding reformists from power." In such settings, all of civil life may become polarized, as Samuel P. Huntington pointed out long ago (though the solutions he advocated proved elusive); and even Putnam's choral societies and bowling leagues--even nuns and bishops!--may become "subversive."[26] 

Monday, May 24, 2010

WHAT IS IT ABOUT CIVIL SOCIETY? [1]

Roy Erickson Mamengko

The "civil society argument," as Michael Walzer calls it, is actually a complex set of arguments, not all of which are congruent.[1] In the rough pastiche that has become the commonly accepted version, a "dense network of civil associations" is said to promote the stability and effectiveness of the democratic polity through both the effects of association on citizens' "habits of the heart" and the ability of associations to mobilize citizens on behalf of public causes. Emergent civil societies in Latin America and Eastern Europe are credited with effective resistance to authoritarian regimes, democratizing society from below while pressuring authoritarians for change. Thus civil society, understood as the realm of private voluntary association, from neighborhood committees to interest groups to philanthropic enterprises of all sorts, has come to be seen as an essential ingredient in both democratization and the health of established democracies. 

Thus summarized, the argument leaves many questions unanswered. Some of these are definitional, arising from the different ways in which civil society has been applied in various times and places. Does it, for instance, include business ("the market") as well as voluntary organizations, or does the market constitute a separate,"private" sphere? If we exclude the market, should we nevertheless include economic associations--trade groups, professional organizations, labor unions, and thelike? What about political organizations? Does it make sense, following Antonio Gramsci, to distinguish "civil" from "political" society? If so, [End Page 38] how are we to distinguish between political associations per se and the political activities of groups in civil society, from interest groups to religious bodies, which are intermittently mobilized in pursuit of political goals?[2] Just when does the "civil" become the "political"? 

Beyond such definitional concerns, there is also the elusive character of the relationship between "civil society" and democratic governance. Just how is it that associations formed among individuals produce the large-scale political and social benefits postulated by the civil society argument? Is the cultivation of "habits of the heart" that encourage tolerance, cooperation, and civic engagement the key? If so, under which circumstances and forms of small-scale interaction are these effects likely to appear? If, as some hold, civil society's chief virtue is its ability to act as an organized counterweight to the state, to what extent can this happen without the help of political parties and expressly political movements? Finally, what prevents civil society from splitting into warring factions (a possibility that theorists since Hegel have worried about) or degenerating into a congeries of rent-seeking "special interests"? What is it about civil society, in other words, that produces the benevolent effects posited by the civil society argument? 

In attempting to answer these questions, it might be useful to make a rough distinction between two broad versions of the "civil society argument." The first version is crystallized in Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, with important antecedents in the work of the eighteenth-century "Scottish moralists," including Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and Francis Hutcheson. This approach puts special emphasis on the ability of associational life in general and the habits of association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity. We shall call this family of arguments "Civil Society I." The second version,articulated most forcefully by Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, and their associates in formulating a strategy for resistance to Poland's communist regime in the 1980s, is also evident in recent literature on processes of "redemocratization" in Latin America. This argument, which we call "Civil Society II," lays special emphasis on civil society as a sphere of action that is independent of the state and that is capable--precisely for this reason--of energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime. 

It might already be apparent that there is a degree of contradiction between "Civil Society I" and "Civil Society II," for while the former postulates the positive effects of association for governance (albeit democratic governance), the latter emphasizes the importance of civil association as a counterweight to the state. There is no reason in principle why the "counterweight" of civil society should not become a burden to a democratic as well as an authoritarian state. Indeed, there are those, such as the economist Mancur Olson, who perceive the "dense webs of association" praised by the civil society argument as enduring [End Page 39] threats to the smooth and equitable functioning of modern states and markets alike.[3] 

Perhaps the most persuasive recent version of "Civil Society I" is that of Robert D. Putnam, formulated in part as an empirically grounded answer to the concerns raised above. Putnam's argument gained particular currency in his January 1995 Journal of Democracy essay, "Bowling Alone." It is more richly elaborated, however, in his study of regional governments in modern Italy, entitled Making Democracy Work. [4] In this book, Putnam attributes the superior effectiveness of northern Italy's regional governments to the dense "networks of civic engagement" fostered by "civil associations" of all kinds. "The denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit," he writes. He continues, with explicit reference to Olson's arguments: "social capital, as embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy, rather than the reverse: Strong society, strong economy; strong society, strong state."[5] 

Putnam's analysis in "Bowling Alone" examines trends in the United States over the last 30 years and argues the obverse: weakening society, weakening economy; weakening society, weakening state. According to Putnam, the basis of "civil community" has been eroding in the United States since the 1960s. We have been depleting our national reserves of social capital, social trust, and generalized reciprocity, he claims, and undercutting our capacity for mutually beneficial collective action. This trend is most evident in the decline of "traditional secondary associations" like the Boy Scouts, parent-teacher associations (PTAs), the League of Women Voters, and even weekly bowling leagues.[6] 

Putnam's argument is stimulating, and his recourse to empirical evidence is refreshing. Nevertheless, his concerns about the health of U.S. civil society and his account of Italy's experiment in regional government point to significant weaknesses in both forms of the civil society argument. These weaknesses raise important questions that must be examined empirically as well as theoretically before we can properly understand the role of civil society in democracy and democratization. 

Our argument is threefold: First, both Putnam's assessment of the state of "civil community" in the United States and his account of regional government in northern Italy underestimate the ability of newer organizations, and of specifically political associations such as social movements and political parties, to foster aspects of civil community and to advance democracy. Second, talk about "networks of civic engagement" glosses over the real, and often sharp, conflicts among groups in civil society. These conflicts, in the absence of specifically political settlements, may spill over into civil disruption and violence. Third, and most important, to understand any polity we must look first at the political settlements that ground it, and to the effects that such [End Page 40] settlements have on social forces and civil society. Taken together, our objections suggest the problematic character of both Putnam's definition of civil society and the larger civil society argument itself. 


What Does Civil Society Do? 

The broader civil society argument ascribes a variety of functions to civil associations. Putnam's discussion focuses on a narrow, though seemingly powerful, segment of them. For Putnam, the chief virtue of civil associations lies in their capacity to socialize participants into the "norms of generalized reciprocity" and "trust" that are essential components of the "social capital" needed for effective cooperation. Civil associations provide the "networks of civic engagement" within which reciprocity is learned and enforced, trust is generated, and communication and patterns of collective action are facilitated. These are horizontal networks, as opposed to the vertical networks of patron-client arrangements or of traditional hierarchical organizations such as the Catholic Church. The broader their reach, the more effective they are: Dense but segregated horizontal networks sustain cooperation within each group, but networks of civic engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation. . . If horizontal networks of civic engagement help participants solve dilemmas of collective action, then the more horizontally structured an organization, the more it should foster institutional success in the broader community. Membership in horizontally ordered groups (like sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid societies, cultural associations, and voluntary unions) should be positively associated with good government.[7] 

That secondary associations generate "social capital" of the sort highlighted by Putnam is scarcely questionable. Whether this "social capital" is truly a "public good," available to society at large and capable of producing the effects ascribed to it, is another matter.[8] Putnam's caveat is important: "Dense but segregated networks" may or may not contribute to effective democratic governance; at times they become the basis for civil strife. Thus the networks that associations create should "cut across social cleavages" in order to nourish wider cooperation.[9]

Putnam's preoccupation here is a familiar one. In order to foster a genuine spirit of "wider cooperation," his argument suggests, such associations must not be "polarized" or "politicized." They must "bridge" social and political divisions and thus, presumably, be autonomous from political forces. These caveats echo a long tradition of "pluralist" analysis. Yet how can such associations shape political participation and "civic engagement" without engaging in specifically political issues and without representing compelling social interests? [End Page 41] 

Putnam's formulation is all the more puzzling in the light of his findings, which place the Emilia-Romagna region in the heart of Italy's zone of "civic engagement." Putnam fails to note that most of this region's sports clubs, choral societies, cooperatives, and cultural associations had been organized by and for two major political parties, the Communists and the Christian Democrats. Indeed, one observer argues, "If a contemporary Tocqueville searched for autonomous groups on which to write on `democracy in Italy,' he would produce a thin volume indeed. . . . Parties usurp space that in other advanced industrialized countries is held by bureaucracies and by local grass-roots organizations. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that they pervade all aspects of political, economic, and social life in Italy." [10] If Putnam's "civil community" can coexist with a seemingly politicized civil society, what are we to make of the argument about the necessity for "inclusive" associations that cut across social and political cleavages? 

Such questions affect not only Putnam's analysis, but also the work of those emphasizing the capacity of civil society to resist state repression, or what we call "Civil Society." [II] A commonplace of this version of the argument is that civil associations must be "autonomous." The argument is aired not just in the scholarly literature, but in political debates over the character and trajectory of civil society in Latin America and Eastern Europe. As Aleksander Smolar put it in a recent Journal of Democracy article, the "society-first" approach of the East European dissidents was "antipolitical." 11 Putnam's evidence, if not his argument, suggests that political autonomy is less important than the fact of association itself. [12] Indeed, Tocqueville himself identified specifically political associations as the key to the rich associational life that he celebrated in the United States of 1832. 

Ironically, both "Civil Society I," which emphasizes the political benefits of an apolitical civil society, and "Civil Society II," which focuses on politically mobilized social actors outside customary political associations, tend to marginalize specifically political associations, especially parties. Convergence on this point, however, does not resolve the definitional imprecision raised at the outset. Indeed, the two versions of the argument disagree about the character of the very civil society they juxtapose to political society. The imprecision stems, in part, from the sheer sweep of the argument itself. Civil society has been credited with enhancing democracy or curbing authoritarianism in contexts as varied as Jacksonian America, post World War II Italy, Eastern Europe at the end of the Soviet empire, and Latin America under the generals. At times the concept seems to take on the property of a gas, expanding or contracting to fit the analytic space afforded it by each historical or sociopolitical setting. 

Both "Civil Society I" and "Civil Society II" reflect the particular contexts to which they have been applied. Proponents of "Civil Society [End Page 42] II" wish to include groups that enable citizens to mobilize against tyranny and counter state power. In doing so, they rightly emphasize the confliction potential of civil society. They also tend to emphasize new forms of association, because political and traditional associations are often tainted by cooperation with the regime. Proponents of "Civil Society I" likewise define "civil society" in ways that fit their particular context. Thus for Putnam, civil society includes chiefly groups whose activities generate the desired "networks, norms, and trust" at the heart of "social capital." In contrast to "Civil Society II," he emphasizes traditional secondary associations, organizations not noted for their confliction character or political weight. The two versions of the argument tend to produce two different portfolios of qualified organizations. But if the argument is not to be circular, we must do better than that. The civil society argument hinges on the virtues of association and of organized society per se; it cannot confront the confliction potential thereof by definitional sleight of hand, but neither can it ignore the conflict at the heart of the modern "organizational society." 


Devaluing Political Associations 

Putnam's neglect of political associations is motivated by both empirical and theoretical considerations. On empirical grounds he rejects political parties as significant actors in the transformations he notes in northern Italy because the same parties produce strikingly different results in the dissimilar social contexts of northern and southern Italy. He also rejects American social movements and nonprofit organizations (whose numbers and membership have grown tremendously over the last 30 years) as significant counterweights to the trends he observes in the United States, but with less careful attention to the evidence. [13] His negative assessment of social movements is based on the grounds that membership in groups like the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the Sierra Club is mainly a matter of financial support and scarcely evidence of "civic engagement" in the concrete sense intended by his argument. 

Putnam's rather cursory examination of social movements in the United States overlooks both the multifaceted character of many national groups and, more importantly, the grassroots bases of the vast majority of social-movement groups operating nationally. Putnam correctly notes that membership in highly professionalized social-movement groups most often consists of little more than writing a check and perusing the group's magazine. Yet closer examination of the Sierra Club, for example, would have shown that this is not always the case. State chapters and especially local chapters of the Sierra Club routinely sponsor community-service projects like urban river clean-ups and "environmentally aware" outdoor activities broadly similar to those sponsored [End Page 43] by the Boy Scouts, a group close to the heart of Putnam's "civic community." 

Furthermore, large groups with a national media profile are simply the most visible promontories in the broader landscape of contemporary social movements. Grassroots groups form the vast majority of social-movement organizations nationally and, compared to Washington-based groups, are far more engaged in the communal life and civic networks of local communities. For example, a recent directory of national environmental organizations listed 645 groups, while the Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, a national clearinghouse for grassroots environmental groups, claims to be in contact with between seven thousand and nine thousand groups nationwide. [14] The demography of the peace movement evinces the same pattern. The 1987 edition of the Grassroots Peace Directory listed 7,700 groups working for peace, but less than 300 claimed to be national in scope and only about half of those were located in Washington. To assess the capacity of the women's movement to promote "civic engagement" solely on an examination of NOW paints a refracted portrait of the efforts of the thousands of rape-crisis centers, battered-women's shelters, women's health clinics, bookstores, theater groups, women's studies programs, credit unions, reading circles, clinic-defense teams, and other "nontraditional" women's groups in localities across the United States. [15] The social ties and trust among members of community-based movement organizations should not be equated with those typical of "mass-mediated" membership organizations. [16] 

These observations would come as no surprise to Tocqueville, who saw specifically political associations as the "great free schools" of democracy in the United States of the 1830s. Tocqueville regarded political associations as dangerous to any regime, including an open one. Yet despite such reservations, he ends by endorsing free political associations on the grounds that only such freedom can prevent "either despotism of parties or the arbitrary rule of a prince," and that political association is in practice the mother of civil association, not the other way around: "So one may think of political associations as great free schools to which all citizens come to be taught the general theory of association." Where political associations are forbidden, Tocqueville continues, "civil associations will always be few, weebly conceived, and unskillfully managed and either will never form any vast designs or will fail in the execution of them." [17] 

Theoretically, the short shrift that Putnam gives to political associations and social movements seems to stem from concerns, similar to those raised by Tocqueville, that are rarely addressed by the proponents of "Civil Society II." For Putnam correctly perceives that not all organized groups contribute positively to "effective governance." In this respect, he echoes the fears not only of the pluralists but of Tocqueville [End Page 44] as well, who treated "political associations" as a different species and wrote, "One must not shut one's eyes to the fact that unlimited freedom of association for political ends is, of all forms of liberty, the last that a nation can sustain. While it may not actually lead it into anarchy, it does constantly bring it to the verge thereof"--a passage that Tocqueville pointedly quotes in his later discussion of the relations between political and civil associations. 

The doubts that Tocqueville raised were grave ones, and were soon enough confirmed by the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. In full-blown political associations, Tocqueville worried, dissidents can league together to "form something like a separate nation within the nation and a government within the government." Were political passions to be raised to such a pitch, could it then be supposed "that in the long run such a group will just talk and not act?"[18] In such circumstances, the "dense networks of civil engagement" generated by associations of all kinds would provide apt recruiting grounds for rival bands bent on destroying their opponents, a probability ably documented by contemporary students of the recruitment strategies of revolutionary movements. 

Against such a possibility Putnam erects a twofold defense: First, he downplays or rejects the role of specifically political associations and movements in his portrait of the "civil community." Second, in describing civil society itself, he adopts the pluralist restriction that only broad, horizontally structured groups capable of "cutting across" salient social cleavages are likely to achieve the effects more generally attributed to civil society. According to the pluralist argument, if citizens belong to a variety of organizations whose memberships "cut across" rather than track "salient social cleavages," such associations will weaken those cleavages and thereby make society more governable. But this is equivalent to arguing that "the weaker civil society, the stronger the state," which is clearly not Putnam's point. Nor is it the civic utopia envisioned by proponents of "Civil Society II," for whom the precise function of civil society is to serve as a counterweight to the state.

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

MARXISME: Tentang Pertentangan Kelas & Ekonomi

Ilustrasi si kaya dan si miskin
Pengantar
Catatan ini ditulis karena permintaan dari beberapa mahasiswa saya, ketika saya sedang memberikan kuliah kepada mereka dengan topik yang tidak bertalian  dengan Konsep Kelas  ini. Saya tanyakan alasan mereka, mengapa butuh  penjelasan dari saya, sementara bacaan yang terkait dengan konsep maupun teori tentang kelas-kelas dalam masyarakat dari berbagai penulis dan dari beragam sudut pandang bertebaran di berbagai perpustaan dan di situs-situs internet yang dengan mudah dapat mereka akses untuk dibaca dan di dalami?

Ada tiga alasan utama  yang mereka sampaikan kepada saya, sehingga permintaan mereka itu saya penuhi. Pertama, karena tidak semua dosen yang mengajar di  fakultas imu sosial dan ilmu politik di dalam perguruan tinggi di Indonesia, secara formal bersedia membahas dan mengajarkan kepada mahasiswanya pemikiran-pemikiran sosial dan politik dari Karl Marx. Keengganan ini kemungkinan besar disebabkan karena trauma dari praktek kekuasaan politik masa pemerintahan rezim Orde Baru, yang melarang bahkan memberangus orang-orang yang diketahui melakukan pendalaman, apalagi mengembangkan  ide-ide Karl Marx, Lenin dan Stalin, baik di dalam maupun di luar universitas.  Kedua, bangkitnya situasi orde reformasi dua belas tahun terakhir, memang tampak kebebasan perpikir dan berpendapat mulai sangat terbuka, namun Ketetapam Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (MPRS) No. XXV/1966 yang membatasi kebebasan berekspresi kalangan masyarakat dan kaum cerdik pandai terkait dengan buah pemikiran Marxime dan Leninisme, tampak belum ada tanda-tanda dari pihak pemerintah untuk mencabutnya. Untuk diketahui; TAP MPRS No. XXV/1966 ini menyebutkan: “bahwa mempelajari paham komunisme/Marxisme-Leninisme dalam rangka mengamankan Pancasila dan secara ilmiah, seperti di iniversitas-universitas, dapat dilakukan secara terpimpin”. Ketiga, permintaan para mahasiswa saya tersebut di atas, saya penuhi tetapi tidak di dalam ruang kelas tetapi melalui; http://www.royerickson.blogspot.com saja.

Kata Marx soal eksistensi manusia
Marx dalam Communist Manifesto  mengatakan; Sampai saat ini, sejarah masyarakat manapun di muka bumi adalah sejarah pertentangan kelas. Si merdeka dengan si budak, kaum bangsawan dengan rakyat jelata, majikan dengan babu, tuan dan pesuruhnya, antara penindas dan tertindas. Posisi yang berhadap-hadapan ini akan selalu ada dan tidak bisa dibantah. Sekarang, perlahan namun pasti, akan ada “perang terbuka”, perang untuk merekonstruksi masyarakat pada umumnya, dan khususnya, untuk menghancurkan kelas penguasa”.[1]

Pesan dalam kutipan itu yang dapat saya tangkap jelas, bahwa menurut  Marx, sejak  manusia lahir  dimuka bumi ini, ia bukannya dimotivasi oleh “ide-ide besar”, melainkan lebih dikendalikan oleh kebutuhan materi, kebutuhan yang dapat membuat mereka bertahan hidup. Ini adalah fakta pertama yang dipakai oleh kaum materialistis dalam melihat sejarah.

Seluruh manusia butuh pangan, sandang dan pangan. Ketika kebutuhan-kebutuhan itu telah terpenuhi, barulah muncul keinginan untuk hal-hal lain, misalnya, seks. Proses reproduksi kemudian melahirkan keluarga dan masyarakat yang tentunya akan menuntut kebutuhan-kebutuhan material yang lebih banyak dan kompleks. Semua itu menurut Marx, hanya bisa terpenuhi dengan membangun dan mengembangkan apa yang disebutnya sebagai “bentuk produksi” (mode of productions).[2]  Keperluan dan kenyamanan hidup kadangkala harus diperoleh dengan berburu dan mengumpulkan makanan dari hutan atau mencari ikan, bercocok tanam dan bentuk-bentuk pekerjaan lainnya.

Selanjutnya, karena masyarakat yang terlibat dalam usaha-usaha ini, dan teridiri dari berbagai tipe, ada yang cekatan dan ada yang lambat, ada yang kuat dan ada yang lemah, maka dengan sendirinya akan terbentuk pembagian kerja (division of labor), lain orang lain tugasnya. Marx menamakan hubungan yang terjadi di tengah-tengah mereka yang sudah terpilah-pilah menurut kemampuannnya ini dengan  “hubungan produksi” (relation of productions). Misalnya; saya adalah seorang pembuat  perahu untuk melaut dan anda pembuat jala untuk menangkap ikan. Dalam masyarakat sederhana dan paling awal ini yang disebut Marx sebagai masyarakat komunis-primitif.  Kedua peralatan tersebut (perahu dan jala) dimiliki oleh setiap anggota masyarakat di kampung dan setiap orang berhak menggunakannya ketika mereka memerlukannya.[ 3]

Bagi Marx, masyarakat komunis primitif tersebut  adalah bentuk organisasi manusia yang paling alami. Dalam kondisi ini, masyarakat bisa menikmati hidup mereka dengan melakukan pekerjaan yang memang mereka inginkan dan butuhkan, serta bisa berhenti pada saat mereka lelah atau tidak merasa membutuhkannya lagi. Mereka merasa memiliki kelompoknya, namun tetap mampu membatasi diri untuk berbuat sesuatu demi kepentingan pribadi masing-masing.

Hubungan kelas dan  produksi menurut Marx
 Dalam perkembangan selanjutnya, terjadilah sebuah perubahan drastis, ketika pengertian hak milik pribadi (privasi) mulai dikenal oleh masyarakat. Dampak perubahan ini sangat nyata dalam tahapan sejarah peradaban-peradaban prasejarah. Menurut Marx, hubungan produksi akan mengalami perubahan 180 derajat dalam masa ini. Si pembuat pembaruan mengklaim perahu yang dibuatnya adalah hak miliknya, begitu juga dengan pembuat jala, yang mengklaim hal serupa. Hubungan antar keduanya hanya akan terwujud bila terjadi proses tukar-menukar hasil pekerjaan mereka, yaitu dengan menjual barang yang mereka hasilkan atau membeli barang yang mereka butuhkan.

Tidak lama kemudian, mencuat kesenjangan antara masyarakat yang menguasai hak milik yang lebih banyak dengan masyarakat yang tidak memiliki apa-apa. Dalam pada itu, dengan berubahnya model produksi yang semula berburu menjadi bercocok tanam, dengan sendirinya orang yang memiliki “properti” yang lebih banyak  akan berada pada posisi yang semakin diuntungkan. Mereka tidak hanya mempunyai berbagai produk pangan, tapi juga menguasai tanah sebagai tempat bercocok-tanam. Karena orang kebanyakan tidak memiliki tanah, dengan sendirinya akan ada yang menjadi tuan tanah, dan yang lainnya hanya menjadi orang-orang yang bergantung  pada kemurahan hati dari para pemilik modal, menjadi pembantu, atau bahkan menjadi  budaknya. Hak milik pribadi dan pertanian adalah dua hal paling penting dalam zaman peradaban klasik. Kedua hal tersebut  telah  membantu mendorong terciptanya krisis hebat dalam kemanusiaan, yaitu pembentukan kelas-kelas berdasarkan kekuatan dan kekayaan. Dari sinilah dimulai konflik sosial secara permanen.[4]

Di zaman pertengahan, model produksi tidak jauh berbeda dengan peradaban klasik. Pada zaman ini, peradaban manusia masih didominasi oleh pertanian. Sedangkan struktur konflik sosial masih terus terbentuk. Tuan tanah dan para pekerja menggantikan posisi tuan dan budak di zaman sebelumnya.

Dalam dunia modern ini pun, konflik antar kelas masih tetap ada, bahkan bertambah tegang dan kian pelik. Kapitalisme modern memperkenalkan model produksi baru dalam bentuk pabrik-pabrik dan  perdagangan. Perubahan model produksi ini tentu saja akan merubah hubungan produksi. Si bos dan si pekerja masih tetap ada. Yang membedakannya dengan peradaban sebelumnya adalah soal “pola konflik yang terjadi antara kedua belah pihak.

Dengan memperkenalkan aktivitas-aktivitas komersil dan tawaran laba dalam skala besar, kapitalisme mem berikan keuntungan bagi orang-orang yang disebut Marx sebagai kaum borjuis atau  “middle Class” (yang dimaksud Marx dengan teminologi ini adalah yang kita kenal sekarang dengan golongan kaya yang berada di atas kelas menengah, seperti para manager dan pemilik perusahaan). Sebaliknya, para buruh yang di-istilah-kan Marx dengan kaum proletariat hampir tidak memiliki apa-apa. Mereka menjual tenaganya seharian kepada pemilik perusahaan agar mendapatkan upah untuk menyangga hidupnya.
  
Situasi ini semakin diperburuk oleh perkembangan kapitalisme menjadi industrialisme. Era industri melahirkan pabrik-pabrik tempat para buruh menghabiskan waktu dan tenaga dengan mesin-mesin yang akan memproduksi barang dalam jumlah yang sangat banyak. Semua ini akan membawa keuntungan berlimpah bagi para pemilik pabrik tersebut. Perkembangan kapitalisme industrial ini semakin menyeret konflik antarkelas kepada titik klimaksnya dan satu fase yang sangat genting, yaitu satu periode dimana penderitaan kaum proletar semakin parah. Dan, di waktu ini pulalah, para buruh menggantungkan nasibnya pada revolusi. Mereka dapat menjadi nekad melakukan penyerangan untuk menghancurkan seluruh sistem sosial-ekonomi yang selama ini telah menindas mereka. Mau tak mau, kekacauan situasi ini harus diterima, karena kaum kaya tidak akan pernah sudi menyerahkan milik mereka, kecuali direbut dengan jalan kekerasan. Bagaimana pun, konfrontasi tidak akan terelakkan lagi sebab memiliki akar sejarah yang sangat dalam yang tak satu masyarakat, bangsa atau kelas pun mampu menahannya.

Misi Komunisme
Di belahan dunia manapun, komunisme punya dua misi sekaligus; Misi pertama adalah “edukasi”. Komunisme harus menjelaskan seluruh kenyataan yang telah diuraikan di atas,  kepada orang-orang yang belum mampu menyadarinya. Misi kedua adalah “aksi”. Paham komunisme  selalu  menyerukan kepada kaum proletar di manapun berada untuk mempersiapkan lahirnya revolusi. Bagaikan sabda Nabi Ibrani Kuno, partai komunis bergerak untuk menghancurkan negara dan kelas penguasa.[5] Dia menyarankan agar para buru membentuk perserikatan, harus ’berenang” sesuai dengan kenyataan aliran sejarah saat ini. Kemudian, memperkokoh kekuatan agar gelombang sejarah bisa takluk di tangan mereka. Akhirnya, mereka akan berusaha meraih masa depan yang lebih cerah disaat telah mampu menghancurkan kapitalisme sampai ke akar-akarnya.

Sesudah badai hebat ini, barulah masa-masa indah penuh kebebasan dan kedamaian akan kembali tercipta dalam kehidupan manusia. Untuk mencapai tujuan ini, pertama-tama tentu ada satu masa transisi, suatu pemerintahan-perantara yang dinamakan Marx dengan “diktator proletariat” (dictatorships of proletariat) agar rakyat miskin yang tidak berdaya dapat dikontrol sepenuhnya. Kekuasaan diktator proletariat ini perlahan-lahan memberi jalan bagi tahap kedua dan tahap final dari episode sejarah, dimana keharmonisan manusia benar-benar terwujud dan tidak ada lagi pembagian kelas serta milik pribadi.[6]

Catatan dan anjuran
Marx bukan satu-satunya orang yang mengetengahkan garis besar konsep pembagian dan pertentangan kelas. Dia memang sepenuhnya sadar bahwa dialah yang menemukan hubungan antara pembagian kelas sosial dengan beberapa tahapan perkembangan ekonomi dan meramalkan masa depan pertentangan kelas ini akan bermuara pada satu revolusi dan hilangnya kelas-kelas sosial tadi. Akan tetapi, kemudian muncul pertanyaan; dari manakah acuan ide-ide ini mula-mula? Bagaimana dia memperoleh suatu pengertian tentang sejarah manusia yang bergerak menuju masa depan yang sangat indah, tapi hanya bisa diraih melalui suatu masa pertentangan yang penuh dengan kekerasan dan kesengsaraan? Untuk menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut, saya menganjurkan kepada kalian menyisihkan waktu  menelusuri sejarah kehidupan Marx di Berlin dan mendalami pengaruh Hegel dalam pemikirannya. Sekian !

Rujukan dan catatan:
[1]        Lihat Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, dalam Selected Works. Hlm. 1:34.

[2]        Tulisan yang dapat membatu memahami teori “model produksi” dan “hubungan produksi” dikarang oleh Terrel Carver, A Marx Dictionary, Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1987.

[3]        Pandangan Marx tentang model produksi dan Kelas-kelas  masyarakat, lihat Friedrich engels (ed.), Caliptal, 3 jilid, New York: Internasional Piblishers, 1967, hlm. I:76-79.  Sedangkan tulisan yang membahas dengan ringkas masalah ini dikarang oleh Julius Smulkstys, Karl Marx, New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1974, hlm. 37-40.

[4]        Uraian konsep Marx tentang “kelas” dan “pertentangan kelas” dapat dilihat dalam Carver, Marx Dictionary, hlm 57-64. McLellan dalam, The Though of Marx, hlm. 151, menerangkan  bahwa Marx tidak pernah menjelaskan konsep ini secara sistematis, walaupun konsep ini adalah jantung pemikirannya. Dia tentu sadar bahwa konsep “kelas” ini bukan barang baru lagi saat itu, karena telah dikaji juga oleh St. Simon dari Perancis. Karya St. Simon dan para penulis sosial Perancis lainnya telah dikenal Marx sejak tahun 1840.

[5]        Tahap akhir dari peseteruan dua kubu , komunis dan kapitalis, proletariat dan borjuis, adalah inti buku The Communist Manifesto,  dalam Marx dan Engels, Selected Works, I: hlm 44. Marx tidak pernah mengabaikan masalah ini dalam setiap tulisannya.

[6]        Uraian tentang Utopia Marx dan Engels terhadap masyarakat tanpa kelas, tanpa ada lagi hak milik pribadi dan pembagian kerja, didapati dalam buku The German Ideology (edisi ke-2), Moscow: Progres Publisher 1845-1846, 1968,  hlm. 44. Di sini mereka berdua menulis, “Kalau saya nanti hidup dalam masyarakat komunis, maka saya akan bisa mengerjakan setengah pekerjaan hari ini, dan setengahnya lagi besok, saya akan berburu di pagi hari, memancing di sore hari, dan mengembalakan ternak saya dimalam hari, berbicara apa saja di saat makan malam. Semua itu saya lakukan tanpa harus berpikir bahwa saya adalah pemburu, pemancing, peternak atau pembual.”

Sunday, December 20, 2009

CLASS STRUCTURATION IN AN ADVANCED CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORMATION (4)

Roy Erickson Mamengko



Introduction
The object of this paper goes beyond a critical review of the vast array of Marxist literature on class determination. More fundamentally, its purpose is to set out a theoretical framework for understanding class structuration in advanced capitalism. This sections outlines this theoretical framework by combining the contributions of previous writers with my own critical evaluation of their work. In my review and critique I have grouped theories of class structure according to particular approaches (of my) designated in the various subsections. Besides elaborating the elements of a theory of class structure, this section makes explicit the rationale for previous categorizations and critiques.


Modes of Production
The starting point for my theory of class structure is the basic distinction between the abstract mode of production and the concrete historical social formation. The characterization of the mode of the production as an abstract formal object in contrast to the social formation as the terrain in which different modes of production come together in actual historical societies has been well drawn by Poulantzas. (See discussion, under The Structuralist Approach.) I accept both his view of the distinction and of the consequences such a distinction implies for an analysis of the class structure of an advanced capitalist social formation, in which the capitalist mode is dominant and thus structures the articulation of capitalism with dominated modes. This complex articulation permits the appearance in the social formation of the two ‘pure’ classes of capitalist mode of production; i.e., capitalists and workers, as well as the appearance of classes and segments which either exist in pure form in other modes of production, or, emerge only at the level of the formation itself, because of its real articulation of multiple modes.

A social formation, however, is actually more complex than the simple distinction between an abstract mode of production and historically concrete social relations. Rather, each mode of production must be understood as itself composed of phase, each of which is an abstract articulation of economic, political and ideological relations. Therefore, a social formation is the concrete overlapping not only of modes of production, but of phases of these modes as well.

My goal is to discuss class and class segment positions in a social formation of advanced capitalism. To do so, it is necessary to provide a sketch of the phases of modes of production which comprise this social formation. As I have previously noted, the characterization of the social formation as a complex articulation of phases and modes implies that each concrete advanced capitalist formation is historically specific and unique. While such formations will always have a capitalist, and working class, the size of these classes, as well as the size and nature of other classes and segments and of the struggles they engage in will vary. The formation we are particularly concerned with is advanced capitalism in the United States. In terms of the phases we will develop, it is a capitalist formation in which the monopoly capitalist phase is dominant, though perhaps in the future to be superseded by the state directed monopoly phase. Unlike other concrete advanced capitalist formations, it does not contain important “remnants” of a feudal mode of production, thus we do not discuss phases of the feudal mode. By the same token, though most of our discussion of class and segment positions is equally applicable to other advanced capitalist social formations, their unique configurations of classes, and important class fractions and social categories requires specific analysis.

My outline of the phases of modes of production important to understanding advanced capitalism in the United States is extremely brief, and does not pretend to offer a complete explicit theory of the articulation of economic, political and ideological relations in each phase. Nevertheless, this sketch of phases does theoretically ground later discussion of the emergence of classes, contradictory class locations, class fractions and social categories from the social processes inherent in the historical progression of phases, as well as in their articulation together in the formation.


Phases of Modes of Production
Numerous Marxist writers use the notion of phases of modes of production (Mandel, 1975; Poulantzas, 1975; Dobb, 1967). This provide us with a handy peiodedization for considering chronological developments in the history of capitalism. The four phases we shall discuss concerning the capitalist mode of production are: (1) simple commodity production; (2) liberal or competitive capitalism; (3) monopoly capitalism; and (4) state-directed monopoly capitalism. Let us briefly define the main characteristics of each phase.

(1) Simple commodity production refers to that process whereby producers cease activity for use – value alone and become involve in exchange economies. Under this set of circumstances, the laborer still maintains control over the means of production, he owns his own tools and more often than not, works in his own shop or that of his family. While simple commodity production, of course, precedes capitalism, it serve as the nascent basis of that system. Simple commodity producers come to expand their operation either through the labor of the extended family or through contractural relations with apprentices. Nonetheless, production remains fairly specialized and limited in market area of exchange.

(2) Competitive Capitalism: This phase seems to follow the initial accumulation of capital possible through simple commodity production. In order for capital accumulation to expand, broader market areas must be achieved. The increase of trade, foreign and domestic, and the rise of mercantilism represents a clear necessity for a broader interpretation of the rights to dispose of property and the freedom of economic activity. The accompanying bourgeois revolutions establishing these rights set loose the early possibilities of industrialization, the factory system, and the expansion of trade through imperialism. Competition between capital units is extremely high while the size of those units remains characteristically small relative to later periods. The petty producer looses his tools (means of production) which become concentrated in the factory system. The real subordination of labor to capital, to be completed by monopoly capitalism with its development of more scientific and “rational” means of social control in production, has begun. Unlike feudalism, the private and public spheres become separated as liberal jurisprudence reifies the contractural relationship as the basis for the unequal exchange between capital and labor. Bourgeois ideals of “moral individualism”, entrepreneurial asceticism, and “free labor” that is mobile to the demands of a rapidly changing market economy become established. The functions of the state lie not in mediating between opposing class forces, but in enforcing the market economy and fascilitating capital accumulation.

(3) Monopoly capitalism is, as its names indicates, the period where consolidation and concentration of capital units becomes critical. In order to achieve economies of scale in production and distribution, capitalists seek to consolidate and merge within and between various economic sectors. With greater technological resources available, the organic composition of capital rises leading to more severe cyclical crises which “cleanse” the market of less efficient producers. Capital intensive operations become predominant and accumulation tends to rest upon the maximization of relative surplus value alone. Concomitantly, as market areas expand and the process of production becomes more complex, the demand for institutions, organizations, and occupational positions involved in circulation and realization activities of capital expand. The differentiation between knowledge of production and authority over what is produced creates complex job hierarchies and pressures for specialization of tasks. Scientific management allows for capital to legitimate greater productivity demands over labor. Moreover, it becomes a major ideological barrier for working class organizations.

(4) State directed monopoly capitalism – State intervention into the economy, while by no means absent during previous phases, becomes critical in this phase. As competition on the monopoly level becomes disruptive to the accumulation environment as a whole, state intervention is required to regulate in favor of the dominant units, in so far as they do not seek to absorb competitors whose loss would result in severe industrial dislocations. The rapid organization of labor also requires mediation and legitimation of this order. With increasing demands for low profit margin activities (health, housing, welfare, etc.) the state attempts either to stimulate private activities and insure profit or to socialize those costs of reproduction through regressive fiscal policies. In either case, strate power becomes the class power of monopoly capital since it provides a way of meeting the various requirements for capital accumulation that can not rest on one firm, sector, or capitalist interest group. It becomes the generalized structure of class interests through which competition within and struggle between classes occur.


Economic, Political and Ideological Relations
A social formation, as we have said, is comprised of the specific articulation of phases of one or more modes of production. As with each phase of a mode of production, the formation is comprised of a totality of social relations. This totality includes economic, political, and ideological relations. Economic relations involve the production, reproduction and distribution of use values, surplus value, surplus labor and oppressive labor processes. The relations of production signals that part of economic relations which is concerned not with distribution, but with production. Political relations can be defined as the production, reproduction and distribution of coercive social control. Ideological relations produce, reproduce and distribute the social control of consciousness. As we have previously noted, the relations of production are themselves comprised of economic, political and ideological aspects which become inseparably fused in the structure of positions we define as classes and contradictory class locations.

The concept of political and ideological relations should not be confused with the notion of political and ideological apparatuses. In an advanced capitalists social formation, the political, or state, apparatus is that complex of institutions whose main function is to aid in the reproduction of capitalist social relations of production by providing the legal framework for their operation, intervening in the capitalist economy to insure its long range survival, and structuring the “legitimate” instruments of repression. Analogously, the ideological apparatus is that complex of institutions whose main function is the production of “ourgeois” ideologies legitimating and insisting upon the necessity of capitalist social relations.

Although we defined classes and contradictory class locations according to criteria which emerge from the structure of the social relations of production, comprised of economic, political and ideological aspects, we have not abandoned the notion of the primacy of the economic in the determination of class positions. Rather, as was discussed in conjunction with our evaluation of Wright’s work, economic primacy resides in the fact that the class structure is ultimately determined by processes inherent in the relations of production, not by political and ideological apparatuses.

In the remaining part of this section, we attempt to set our view of the class structure of an advanced capitalist social formation. This structure of positions entails class positions, contradictory class locations, fractions of classes and social categories. Moreover, classes, fractions and categories overlap or cross cut within a social formation according to the economic, political and ideological relations which characterize that formation and result in the particular form and direction of its class struggles. We take up these issues in two major subsections. First, we discuss the composition of classes and the criteria for defining them. We then discuss the theoretical basis for defining class fractions and social categories and designate those we consider most important in the contemporary United States.

Class Positions: Relations of Production
Within the social formation of advanced capitalism, the fundamental structure of class positions has been well delineated by the work of Erik Wright. We have rephrased Wright’s view of the role of political and ideological relations in determining classes, but we have left his criteria for defining both classes and contradictory locations intact.

To recapitulate Wright’s view, the juridical relations of legal ownership of the means of production, legal status as an employer of labor power, and legal status as wage labor can no longer be used to delineate the class structure because these juridical criteria do not necessarily coincide with the real relations of production. Rather, we must rely on criteria which emerge from real aspects of the relations of production. These are control over investment and accumulation, control over the physical means of production, and control over labor power. These criteria are useful because they allow us to designate the two ambiguous locations (or, as we have termed them, pure classes) of the capitalist mode of production, i.e., capitalists and workers, as well as the classes and contradictory locations which emerge in a social formation of advanced capitalism from the articulation of phases of the capitalist and other modes of production.

The capitalist class has full control over the process of investments and accumulation, over the physical means of production, and over labor power. The working class defined by total absence of control along these dimensions. These two classes exist in all phase of the capitalist mode of production and will exist in a formation of advanced capitalism as well.

Wright estimates that in the United States, one to two percent of the economically active population belongs to the capitalist class defined by these criteria to include both traditional capitalists, that is, legal owners of the physical means of production and legal employers of labor power, and top corporate executives. (Wright, 1976: 37) The working class is estimated by Wright to include forty to fifty percent of the economically active population. These criteria indicate that fully proletarianized labor, whether it is productive or unproductive, manual or nonmanual, industrial commercial or service, belongs in the working class. Thus, for example, most clerical and secretarial employees as well as cashiers automobile workers, lathe operators, steel workers, painters and janitors are working class.

In Wright’s schema, a capitalist social formation dominated by the monopoly phase contains a third unambiguous location. However, this class location exists in pure form not in the capitalist mode proper, but rather in the transition phase between feudal and capitalist modes, that is, in simple commodity production. This class location is that of the petty bourgeoisie. Petty bourgeois producers control investments and accumulation as well as the physical means of production, but do not control the labor power of others. The petty bourgeoisie theoretically includes small shopkeepers, independent professionals who employ no labor power and independent artisans and craftsmen. Wright estimates that four to five percent of the economically active population in the United States occupies petty bourgeois positions.

Wright has not explicitly discussed the notion of the fundamental interests of the petty bourgeoisie. While the fundamental interest tied to the petty bourgeois position is the maintenance of simple commodity production, it is clear that in an advanced capitalist social formation this interest has little hope of realization. What becomes most important is the position of petty bourgeoisie in relation to the principle contradiction of the capitalist mode; that is, the struggle between capital and labor. While the petty bourgeoisie can not unambiguously share the fundamental interests of either capital or labor, the petty bourgeois is probably closer to that of the capitalist class. Petty bourgeois producers do individually own and control the physical means of production, and thus are far from having an objective interest in socialism. On the other hand, the process of accumulation and centralization of capital potentially threatens the class of petty producers. Thus, the petty bourgeoisie must be somewhat wary of the capitalist class as well.

The three sets of contradictory locations which Wright presents are small employers, semi-autonomous employees, and managerial and supervisory personnel. These locations result from three historical processes – the differentiation of the function of capital, the development of complex hierarchies of management and supervision, and the loss of control over the labor process by the direct producers.

As previously noted, Wright presents an elaborate picture of the set of contradictory locations between the capitalist and the working class. Top managers, who retain control of investments and decisions relating to the subunits of production of which they are a part, as well as possessing a large amount of control over both labor power and the physical means of production, occupy a contradictory location of this set which entails interests closest to the fundamental interests of the proletariat. Middle managers and technocrats occupy the positions between the capitalist and working class which are the most contradictory. Wright estimates top and middle managers and technocrats to comprise about twelve percent of the U.S. economically active population. Bottom managers, foremen and line supervisors occupy eighteen to twenty-three percent of this population.

The contradictory location between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie is that of small employers. It is only within capitalist relations of production that surplus value is extorted from exploited labor power, thus, the qualitative distinction between the capitalist class and the petty bourgeoisie is that the latter do not exploit labor. Those who produce a fraction of their own surplus, but who also employ labor power to generate or realize surplus value occupy a contradictory location between the petty bourgeoisie and the capitalist class. As Wright notes, as the number of employees increases, the percentage of the surplus generated by the employer him/herself declines to a small fraction of the total. In this process, there is no a priori theoretical basis for deciding at what point the employer becomes a capitalist proper. Using ten employees as the upper boundary of this set of contradictory locations, Wright estimates that small employers comprise about six percent of the U.S. economically active population. Using fifty employees as the upper boundary of small employers yields an estimate of approximately seven percent. Again, while the interests of this position are not explicitly discussed, it is clear that the small employer location entails the fundamental interests of petty producers and of capital. The greater the percentage of surplus generated by employees, the closer is the contradictory location to that of the capitalist class.

The last set of contradictory locations in the relations of production is that of the semi-autonomous employees who occupy a contradictory position between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. Viewed in the context of the proletarianization process in which the domination of capital has penetrated the domain of the direct producers to transform the labor process, semi-autonomous employees have lost status as independent producers. Nevertheless, while employed by capital, they retain a relatively large amount of control over their own labor process. They either have no control or have minimal control over the work of others. University professors, who are relatively free to decide the content of their research and courses, as well as to set their own work hours, are good examples of semi-autonomous employees. Skilled craftsmen, highly skilled technical employees and high school and elementary school teachers are others examples. Wright estimates that this set of contradictory locations is filled by seven to fourteen percent of the U.S. economically active population. The implication in terms of fundamental interests is that this set of locations entails the fundamental interests of the proletariat. Thus, elementary school teachers and university teaching assistants should be closer to the boundary of the working class than the position of full professor.

Political and Ideological Apparatuses
In a recent extension of his work on class structure, Wright (1977) has considered class positions within the political and ideological apparatuses. Based on both a functional and an internal structural argument, Wright is able to identify bourgeois, proletariat, and contradictory managerial and supervisory locations within the state and ideological institutions. (1977: 8-11) Bourgeois positions in these institutions involve the creation of administrative policy, repression or ideology, while contradictory locations in the bureaucratic hierarchy of these institutions involve the execution, but not creation of such policy or ideology. Proletarian positions are completely excluded from both creation and execution.

…”to take a concrete example, the top administrative positions within the police would constitute a bourgeois position within the state apparatus, a beat policeman occupies a contradictory location; and a clerk or janitor within a police station occupies a working class position” (Wright, 1977: 8).

It is the functional relationship of the political and ideological apparatuses to the relations of production themselves which ultimately allows such a designation of class positions. Since these apparatuses reproduce capitalist relations of production, the creators of their policies and ideologies can be thought of as occupying capitalist positions, whereas the executors of their policies occupy contradictory supervisory positions.

It should be noted that in this most recent paper, Wright differentiates among fundamental economic, political and ideological interests and develops his argument about class positions and contradictory locations within political and ideological structures with reference to fundamental political interests – maintenance or overthrow of the capitalist state – of bourgeois and proletariat state positions.

It is unclear how Wright intends this discussion of class positions to relate to the general relations of production argument we have just recapitulated and accepted. The analogy between top administrators in the state and ideological apparatuses and those in the economic process is easy to draw. Top political and ideological administrators control the overall decision-making of the apparatus, the physical means of production, and labor power. Their position is thus equivalent to that of the corporate executive location which relations of production criteria defined as capitalist. However, contradictory locations in political and ideological apparatuses have not been delineated according to relations of production criteria applied to the internal relations of production of these apparatuses. According to the three relations of production criteria, control over accumulation and investment decisions, control over the physical means of production and control over labor power, those who merely execute predetermined tasks are working class. Thus, taking up Wright’s example, according to relations of production criteria beat policemen would not occupy a contradictory location between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: rather, they would be working class. There would be contradictory managerial and supervisory locations in the state and ideological institutions. These would be the positions which entailed second order administrative policy making and supervision.

One could argue that Wright’s analysis implies that police occupy a contradictory position between capital and labor with reference to fundamental political interests, but not with reference to fundamental economic interests. In fact, Wright’s theoretical arguments create the possibility of yet another kind of contradiction inherent in positions, which are located within the totality of social relations: such positions may occupy different class locations with reference to each of the three sets of differentiated relations, economic, political and ideological.

The conceptualization of objective interests may be economic, political or ideological adds much complexity to analysis, but it is uncertain whether differentiating three sets of objective interests will yield great insight into the basic class structure of a social formation. Tentatively, it seems preferable to us to return to delineating this basic class structure with reference to a notion of fundamental interest in the totality of capitalist – or socialist – social relations, of which the relations of production form the core. The three control criteria embodied in the relations of production would then be used in political and ideological institutions, as well as in economic institutions, to delineate class position. In this perspective an ordinary beat policemen who executes what others conceive becomes working class, for he shares a fundamental objective interest in socialism. An investigator-detective, on the other hand, would be a semi-autonomous employee.

If, because of the functional relationship of political and ideological apparatuses to the relations of production, we agreed with Wright that beat policemen occupy a contradictory supervisory position, we would be employing as a criterion the fact that they reproduce capitalist social relations. We would, as well, be allowing this functional criterion to supercede internal relations of production criteria. In our review and critique of existing literature, we explicitly rejected approaches that determine the boundary of the working class by relying on the criterion of the reproduction of capitalist social relations. In the extreme except in a revolutionary conjuncture all positions reproduce capitalism. This does not mean that workers become something other than working class.

Thus, in attempting to locate fundamental class positions in political and ideological institutions, it seems preferable to rely on internal relations of production criteria. Nonetheless, Wright correctly points out that despite the resemblance of top administrative positions in political and ideological institutions to those in economic institutions, it is difficult to conceive of such positions as capitalist without a theory which links those political and ideological institutions to the reproduction of the relations of production. Without this functional criterion, we do not have a strong case for claiming that these top political and ideological administrative positions are unambiguously capitalist. It is our view that despite the general incorrectness of functional criteria, it is correct to allow functional criteria to operate in the one case of designating such top administrative positions capitalist. This is because in the case of top administration, the functional criterion ratifies criteria embodied in the internal relations of production of political and ideological institutions: the functional criterion does not supercede them.

The major inspiration for all views that hold that policemen, guard labor, soldiers, etc., can not be working class is that their position gives them an objective interest in the maintenance of the capitalist state and with it capitalist relations of production. We recognize that this interest exists. Nonetheless, to anticipate the next section we maintain that this interest is not a fundamental interest in the preservation of capitalism, but rather an immediate interest associated with positions which are simultaneously working class and a part institutionalized social categories – in this case the state and ideological apparatuses. Because these categories are institutionalized to function in the reproduction of capitalist social relations, the objective immediate interests associated with them are particularly likely to obscure fundamental working class interests.

Class Fractions and Social Categories
Introduction.
In this section I’m set forth the specific segments of the class structure; class fractions, and social categories. This entails a twofold task. First, I must provide a unified theory of the vast array of concrete social groupings of class fractions and social categories. Second, I must do this in a way that neither loses sight of the valid insistence of Marxism upon the dichotomistic nature of fundamental class antagonism, nor fails to acknowledge the reality of this vast array.

Theoretical Statement
My analysis here draws heavily upon the work of Poulantzas (1973a, 1973b, and 1973c) and Wright (1977). It combines Wright’s distinction of fundamental and immediate interests with Poulantzas’ distinction of class fractions from social categories in order to clarify the theoretical basis for our further elaboration of specific segments within the class structure. The concept we employ are the following: Fundamental interests are interests in the retention or transformation of a given mode of production and are thereby coterminous with basic class positions. Immediate interests exist both in the arena of the relations of production and in the arena of political and ideological relations but do not call into question the given mode of production. Differing immediate interests in the relations of production define class fractions while differing immediate interests in political and ideological relations define social categories.

As I have argued above, classes are distinguished by how their differing fundamental interests emerge from differing positions within the relations of production. Class fractions are discernable, bounded segments within particular classes. Immediate interests connected to relations of production such as market processes, social relations of control, labor market segmentation, and other particularizations of fundamental class relations provide the basis for fractions of classes. Consequently, while fractions are defined as in Poulantzas (1973a) according to differing objective processes in the relations of production (what Poulantzas calls the “economic” realm) they are distinguishable according to Wright (1977) by their differing immediate interests. As Poulantzas (1973c; 38) argues, fractions “coincide with important economic differentiation and, as such, can even take on an important role as social forces, a role relatively distinct from that of the other fractions of their class.”

Social categories are distinguished from class fractions in that social categories do not derive their basis from distinctions in the relations of production. Rather, as Poulantzas has stated, the dominant criteria for social categories are political and ideological. While class fractions are determined primarily by the relations of production (economic level) they take on consequences not only on the economic but on the political and ideological levels as well. Social categories, on the other hand, are determined primarily by political and ideological relations and institutions, but are consequential for the relations of production as well. Concretely, a social formation encompasses the intersection of class fractions and social categories. This is so precisely because, as Poulantzas says, “social categories themselves belong to classes: they are not groups ‘outside’ or ‘alongside’ classes” (1973c: 40). This does not imply that a given social category must be part of only one class. Rather, it means that within a social category we may find positions within the relations of production that belong to different social classes and contradictory class locations.

This distinction between class fractions and social categories is akin to the spatial distinction between vertical and horizontal segmentation. Class fractions are essentially vertical segments within classes. These vertical segments entail differing strengths and weaknesses not only in relation to other classes, but in relation to other fractions of their across the entire class structure. This is the case with the social category of race.

Class Fractions
I can now turn to a discussion of the actual class fractions and social categories which make up our social formation of advanced capitalism. Relying on the theoretical basis in the outlined in the immediately previous paragraphs, we first discuss fractions. In order to maintain that a particular set of segments comprise fractions of a class we must demonstrate two things. First we must establish that each of these segments is actually a segment of the same class by showing their differing immediate interests in the relations of productions. As we shall see, simply being able to designate on the abstract level a fraction based on some differentiation does not means that these fraction will have political or economic consequences in a particular social formation. For example, we shall argue that commercial, banking and industrial fractions of capital, while perhaps important in the competitive phase of the capitalist mode of production are relevant in the analysis of monopoly capitalism only is so far as monopoly capital is characterized by an increasingly successful attempt to overcome these differentiated fractional interests through a process of vertical integration.

Fractions Within the Capitalist Class.
There are two dimensions along which fractions within the capitalist can be designated. The first dimension is function in the production and realization of surplus value. The categories here are banking, industrial and commercial fractions. The second dimension is size and centralization of capital involved in the production and realization process. The categories here are monopoly and competitive capital. Competitive capital can be further divided into old and new fractions. Old competitive capital is a residual from the competitive phase of the capitalist mode of production. New competitive capital is produced and reproduced entirely within the monopoly phase of the capitalist mode of production. All these segments can be considered fractions of the capitalist class because they share the common fundamental interest in the perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production. They are fractions, however, of the capitalist class because their immediate interests differ.

The competitive phase of capitalism witnessed the beginning of the fractioning along the lines of banking, commercial and industrial capital. These segments of capital comprised actual fractions because they maintained differing immediate interest in the accumulation process. The immediate interest of banking capital was to obtain a return on its investments to productive capital at as high a rate as possible. The immediate interest of productive capital was to obtain investment capital at the lowest possible rate, and to sell its commodities to the commercial sector at the highest possible price. In turn, the immediate interest of the commercial sector was to buy commodities from the productive commercial sector at the lowest possible price. Even in the competitive phase these fractions did not always exhibit conflicting immediate interests in actual practice. Nevertheless, these segments are validly considered fractions of the capitalist class in the competitive phase. In the monopoly phase this fractioning of the capitalist class diminished in importance because of the process of vertical integration. While there continues to be a differentiation of capitalist positions according to function, the largely successful struggle of capital to erode these differentiations through vertical integration both attests to the importance of the fractioning in the past and attests to its decreasing importance for an analysis of monopoly capitalism.

The monopoly phase of capitalism introduced fractioning of capital into monopoly and competitive positions along the lines of size and centralization of capital. Different production processes affecting the monopoly and competitive fractions lead to conflicting immediate interests in the market place. The monopoly fraction is able to employ vast sums of capital and the latest technology in the production of low-cost mass-produced commodities and capital goods. The competitive fraction is unable to employ these means of production and is driven out of the most profitable markets by competitive capital. These conflicting immediate interests extend as well to relations with the state. Monopoly capital is interested in having the state underwrite productive programs for infrastructure and social capital outlays that are more extensive than the competitive fraction needs or desires. The competitive sector which receives a smaller share of the direct benefits of these expenses than the monopoly fraction is forced, nonetheless, to pay for them through the same or higher actual tax schedule.

As state above, the competitive fraction in turn is differentiated into old and new fractions. The old competitive capital fraction has interests in the retention of areas of production and the market for those products will fall outside the sphere of monopoly capital. Almost all retail enterprises (which are not petty bourgeois) fall into this fraction of the capitalist class. The new fraction of competitive capital has interests in the retention of an area of production within the sphere of production dominated by monopoly capital. In these areas it is allowed by monopoly capital to exist and to realize a profit. These production processes are not taken over by monopoly capital for reasons such as low profitability and fear of state anti-trust action.

Such fractioning of the capitalist class by size and centralization of capital may be of decreasing importance in the current social formation. The old competitive capital fraction is increasingly swallowed up by the monopoly sphere. As argued by Poulantzas (1973a, 1975) the new competitive fraction is becoming increasingly integrated in a subordinate manner in the monopoly sphere of production. The determination of productions, prices, and methods of production for this fraction is increasingly controlled by the monopoly fraction. As the struggle for vertical integration indicated both the saliency and the passing of functional fractions of capital, the movement toward corporate integration through conglomerates own and other classes. Social categories are horizontal segments across classes. They may be entirely contained within one class. Or, as is more likely, they may be more politically salient to one class, although extended is an attempt to overcome the struggle of conflicting immediate interests among fractions of the capitalist class determined by size and centralization of capital.

Working Class Fractions.
I believe that the three most salient working class fractions in the United States social formation of advanced capitalism are (1) workers with strong capacities for the attainment of benefits from the resources of the monopoly sector, (2) workers with a weak capacity for the attainment of benefits from the resources of the competitive sector, (3) workers in the state sector. These fractions are explicitly fractions within the working class; we do not threat here fractions which might exist within contradictory locations.

In the competitive phase of capitalism different working class fractions were salient. During this phase the working class was comprised of an industrial fraction as well as a commercial and service fraction. This division is the basis for the traditional Marxist analysis of productive (creation of surplus value) and unproductive (realization of surplus value) labor. While sharing a fundamental interest in the dissolution of capitalist relations of production, productive and unproductive workers were divided by differing immediate interests. In brief, the immediate interest of productive labor was centered on a reduction of the rate of exploitation. This entailed raising the proportion of necessary to surplus labor time. These workers therefore shared immediate interests in attaining relations of production, worker organization (unions), and legal structures that would accomplish this decrease in the rate of exploitation. Unproductive workers in the commercial and service sectors were paid out of the surplus value extracted from productive labor. Their immediate interests entailed obtaining greater benefits from their employer. The condition for this struggle was conditional on the extraction of greater and greater surplus value from productive workers. Therefore their immediate interests were in conflict with those productive workers.

In the monopoly phase of capitalism the division of labor into productive and unproductive fractions ceases to be as consequential as it was in the competitive phase. The vertical and horizontal centralization of capital in the monopoly phase erode the basis for the differentiated immediate interests of these working class fractions. Since capital is no longer segmented into productive and unproductive sectors and both the production and the realization of surplus value occur within one form there is only one stock of revenue to struggle over.

The productive/unproductive fractions of the competitive phase of capitalism give way to working class fractions based on the monopoly/competitive capital split of the monopoly phase of capitalism. Through monopoly pricing a greater and greater share of surplus value floes to the monopoly sector and provides a poll of resources which workers in this sector can struggle over. Therefore, centralization of capital is not necessarily antithetical to the immediate interests of this working class fraction: Monopoly pricing cuts into the revenue share of the competitive sector and reduces the available poll of benefits to be won by the workers of this sector. Increasing centralization of capital is clearly antithetical to the interest of workers in this sector.

The division of workers into two sectors of monopoly and competitive capital is only a first approximation of the true working class fractions which exist in the current social formation. The most creative attempt to analyze the structure of working class fractions in advanced capitalism has been the dual labor market literature. According to many of the writers in this tradition, sectors of capital correspond to fractions of the working class. This analysis assumes that there is a one to one correspondence between the way the pool of resources of worker benefits is differentiated by sectors of capital and the way job characteristics representing differentiated capacities of class fractions, allow workers to take advantage of these resources. For instance, as we have seen, Bluestone (1970) links primary, secondary and irregular working class positions to monopoly, competitive and irregular sectors of economy. In order to analytically describe the fractions of the current social formation of monopoly capitalism, we maintain that it is necessary to explicitly separate the two dimensions of capital sector and job characteristics which define immediate interest and therefore the fractions of the working class.

The first dimension that defines differing immediate interests and therefore fractions of workers is the sector of capital in which the worker is employed. The sector of employment provides the stock of resources from which workers can struggle to gain benefits. Worker interests diverge according to sector of capital since the resources of these sectors are accumulated in conflicting ways. Unlike the majority of writers in the dual labor market tradition, who only differentiate between the monopoly and the competitive sectors of capital, our analysis concurs with that of O’Connor (1973) who distinguishes a state sector with its particular stock and method of accumulation of resources from which worker benefits can be won. The second dimension that defines working class immediate interests and fractions is that of worker capacities for the struggle to attain specific benefits from the accumulated resources in the sector in which they are employed. This dimension implies two working class fractions, those with strong capacities for struggle and those with weak capacities for struggle. We call these fractions respectively primary and secondary positions. Positions with strong as opposed to weak capacities for struggle have many or all of the following characteristics: (1) characteristics of worker organization, such as unionization and legally established regulations for hiring, firing, pay scales and promotions; and (2) characteristics of the integration of social and technical relations of production, such as the lack of direct measurability of individual tasks, on-the-job training, and interdependence of workers.

Logically, these two dimensions combine to define six possible working class fractions; that is, those with either strong or weak capacities for struggle in each of the monopoly, competitive, or state sectors. Our task then, is to identify the immediate interests underlying each of the six fractions. The immediate interests of workers in the monopoly and competitive sectors, as just discussed, diverge mainly in reference to support for the increasing centralization of capital. The immediate interests of workers in the state sector conflict with the immediate interests of workers in the monopoly or competitive private sectors because state workers must win their benefits from a stock of resources comprised of surplus value extracted from the private sector workers. The immediate interests of workers with strong, as opposed to weak, capacities diverge according to their relation to the state. Workers with weak capacities for struggle for benefits in their productive unit have an interest in state intervention to achieve economic redistribution and to exert various constraints upon capital which the workers themselves are unable to exert. This interest becomes specified in the call for social welfare programs which provide health and retirement benefits and and the call for minimum wage provisions and regulation of pension procedures. Workers with strong capacities for struggle in their work relations can exert direct pressure on capital for benefits. As opposed to workers with weak capacities, those with strong capacities enjoy more lucrative wages, health and retirement plans as well as the ability to secure and extend these benefits from employers themselves. Thus, it is not in the interest of workers with strong capacities to subsidize, via the taxation system, state welfare to those with weak capacities.

Although the two dimensions along which working class interests are defined provide for six possible working class fractions we believe, as stated at the outset, that there are only three salient working class fractions in the current social formation. The first fraction we identify consist of state sector workers. In the state sector, weak and strong capacities do not differentiate two fractions of the working class. Although real differences in capacities for struggle exist among state sector workers, these different capacities do not define conflicting immediate interest. Through regulation and custom, state sector health and retirement benefits are distributed across the work force in a manner generally unrelated to capacities for struggle. Wage differences reflect wage inequalities in the private sector but, again, are dampened by regulation and custom. The immediate interest that makes state workers a fraction in the social formation derives from their common position in the state sector. This position dictates an immediate interest in the expansion of the state sector.

The second prominent working class fraction is comprised of positions with weak capacities for struggle located in the competitive sector. This fraction is defined according to the coincidence of its two sources of immediate interests. From its position in the competitive sector, this fraction has an interest in opposing the increasing centralization of capital and the resulting uneven development of productive forces. From its position of possessing weak capacity for struggle, this fraction has an interest in state intervention in the relations of production for the reduction of the inequalities and the provision of further benefits. The coincidence of these two sets of differentiated interests defines this working class fraction. Because the stock of resource against which this fraction can make claims is small and because this fraction has a weak capacity for extracting benefits from this stock of resource, it turn to the state for social services, for protection of its weakened bargaining power for wages, and for state support of its productive sector.

Positions in the monopoly sector with weak capacities for struggle do not form a separate fraction. Rather, because these positions are excluded from the benefits which accrue to workers with strong capacities for claims on monopoly resources, their interests as positions with weak capacities for struggle take precedence: the interests of this potential fraction of the working class coverge with those of weak capacities workers in the competitive sector.

Strong capacitied working class positions in the competitive sector are also included in this second fraction which we have just described. In the abstract, these positions have the possibility of comprising a separate fraction. The strong capacity for struggle attached to these positions grants these positions the potential to extract benefits independent of the state. However, because competitive sector resources remain relatively low this potential can not be realized. Therefore, the interest which positions of this potential fraction have in state social services and legal constraints against super-exploitation converge with the interest of weak capacitied competitive and monopoly positions.

The third and final prominent working class fraction is comprised of position with strong capacities for struggle located in the monopoly sector. This fraction is defined according to the coincidence of its two sources of immediate interests. From its position in the monopoly sector, this fraction has an immediate interest in the increasing centralization and uneven development of capital. From its position of strong capacity for struggle, this fraction has an interest in opposing state social welfare programs and in resisting taxation for these programs. The coincidence of these two sets of differentiated interests defines a working class fraction of high capacitied workers in the monopoly sector. Because the stock of resources against which this fraction can make claims is large and because this fraction has a strong capacity to extract benefits from this stock, it relies upon its own capacities for attainment of its share of the benefits made available by the expansion of the monopoly sector. Therefore, this fraction opposes social welfare expanses but support state investment geared to the expansion of the monopoly sector.

Fractions of the Petty Bourgeoisie and Contradictory Class Locations.
While my criterion of weak and strong capacities for struggle for resources could be applied, in modified form, to differentiate fractions in the petty bourgeoisie, my criterion of differentiation along the dimension of sector of the economy is not applicable to this class. Petty bourgeois producers with strong capacities for struggle are those who are able to make use of licencing and other mechanisms to induce a scarcity of supply of these positions, as well as to induce artificial monopoly-type pricing. Independent lawyers and doctors fall in this category. Petty bourgeois positions with weak capacities for struggle are those engaged in competitive markets open to easy access and to price competition. Small shopkeepers and framers exploiting no labor fall in this category. Validation of such segments as salient class fractions awaits demonstration that they entail different immediate interest which could potentially be activated in struggle.

As I have said above contradictory class locations are not themselves fractions of the working, the capitalist class, or the petty bourgeoisie. Rather than being differentiated by conflicting immediate interests contradictory class location are differentiated by the saliency of one or another fundamental class interest. Nevertheless each set of contradictory class locations may itself be segmented into fractions according to the segmentation of conflicting immediate interests. The conflicting immediate interests of contradictory class locations between the capitalist class and the working class are determined according to the same criteria that we have discussed in relation to capitalist class and working class fractions. The dimension that differentiates the capitalist class according to sectors is directly applicable to contradictory class locations to some extent share fundamental interests with the capitalist class. The two dimensions (capital sectors and capacities for struggle) which define working class fractions are also directly applicable to contradictory class locations because these locations to some extent share fundamental interest with the working class. Designation of the actual salient class fractions which the complex coincidence of fundamental and immediate interests of each contradictory location implies would require a close analysis of the actual convergence of such interests embodied in each fraction. While such a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe it could be done, and that contradictory class locations between the capitalist class and the petty bourgeoisie, as well as those located between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class could be analyze in a similar fashion.

Social Categories
The importance of social categories for the analysis of class structure is that social categories provide a basis for a unity of consciousness and organization in the social formation that either cuts across or reinforces the segmentation of classes and class fractions. As Poulantzas (1973c, 40) says, social categories are consequential since they may, “because of their relation to the state apparatuses and ideology, present a unity of their own, despite the fact that they belong to various classes; and what is more, in their political functions, they can present a relative autonomy vis-à-vis the classes to which their members belong.”

This means that despite the fact that social categories are not grounded in the relations of production, class analysis must take account of them both theoretically and politically. In a sense, this is Marxist analysis going beyond Weber. In a social formation there are groupings of positions in people’s consciousness as well as in actual social movements that are based on immediate interests not corresponding to potions in classes or fractions. These groups, or social categories, are based on immediate interests defined primarily in the political and ideological realm. This is true because these immediate interests affect whether – and it what manner – alliances of classes and fractions take shape. Thus the theoretical importance of social categories is that segmentation distinguished along these lines reflects potentially conflicting or uniting immediate interests which cross-cut or reinforce class and class-fraction struggles. For instance as the dual labor market literature has illustrated, the social categories race and sex tend to parallel the dimension of class fractioning of weak and strong capacities for struggle. Since race and sex are ideologically consequential groupings which overlay primary and secondary positions, the fractioning according to immediate economic interests of these positions is itself overlayed with this ideological segmentation. The resulting immediate interests are particularly salient and produce very effective mystification of the common fundamental interests of all working class positions.

Other social categories also serve to reinforce or attenuate class relations in similar ways. Some of this social categories are economic such as the distinction of “rich” and “poor”, or the distinction among occupations. Further examples included the “underclass”, (after occupations) underemployed, unemployed, marginal population and subproletariat. How such economic distinctions can be considered social categories requires some explanation. Social categories, as we have said, are unities of consciousness and organization based upon shared immediate interests. These immediate interests are consequential because they direct consciousness and political activity according to political and ideological considerations rather than because of their connection to the relations of production. Thus, economic distinctions may be the basis for social categories rather than for classes or class fractions when these distinctions create common interests that gain their social importance from their political impact and ideological meaning.

Social categories, like race and sex, which are more directly defined by ideology and the political apparatus included unities of ethnicity and religion; neighborhood, geographical, and rural-urban locations; mental vs. manual, and white vs. blue collar categories; age; and any number of other familiar popular groupings of positions.

A social category not often considered but which is especially relevant for class analysis is that of an institution. Identification with an institution provides a salient manner in which classes and class fractions are unified for the attainment of immediate interests not necessarily defined by the fundamental or even immediate interests of the classes and fractions. For instances, textile workers join capitalist in that industry in calling for particular import and tariff regulations to protect their economic viability. This also true for positions in Japanese firms and workers in the touted worker-managed firms in the U.S. workers who fill these positions are induced by organizational relations and ideology to consider their firm of employment as the most relevant determinant of their immediate interests.

Especially susceptible to being unified by institutional social categories are positions located in the church, and state. Where identification with the institutions is strong, these positions consider their immediate interest tied more to the interests of the institutions than to those of their class or fraction. This applies in a striking way to locations in the bureaucratic hierarchies that come to identify with the social category of their institution. Because of the function of political and ideological institutions in the reproduction of capitalist social relations, incumbents in these bureaucracies tend to resolve their contradictory class locations by pursuing the interests of their institution, and thereby, thje fundamental interests of the capitalist class. Incumbents of working class positions in political and ideological institution are, as we have noted, particularly susceptible to mystification of their objective and fundamental interest as workers. We have argued that policemen, prison guards and soldiers are working class on the basis of their subordinate position of the execution in the internal relations of control in the state apparatus. However, their role as part of the repressive state apparatus is to enforce the relations of domination necessary for the reproduction of capitalism on both national and international scale.

Therefore, because the institution in which the police and low ranking military are employed functions directly for the reproduction of capital, when these workers identify with the social category of their particular institution in the state apparatus rather than with their class position, they end up consolidating the fundamental capitalist interests to which their institutions is articulated.

Conclusion
In this major section of the book’s I have discussed the abstract theoretical elements which can be seen to comprise and structure concrete social formations. Having considered these theoretical elements, I have elaborated the basic class structure of an advanced capitalist social formation, and I have sketched a picture of its most important class fractions and social categories. In the concluding few pages of this book, I briefly consider the implications of my analysis has for the class struggle.

Conclusion: Classes and Segments, Interests and the Class Struggle.
In concluding this analysis, my offer a brief discussion of the relationship between the structure of class and segment positions I have outlined and the class struggle. While this paper has not attempted to develop a theory of the relationship between structure and struggle, I do assert the following. First, the structure of positions we have analyzed has been shaped in part by the class struggle. Second, our structural analysis has important implications for the class struggle and those who are involved in it.

The analysis of the development both of contradictory class locations and of class fractions has signaled the role of struggle in the creation of these positions. Broadly speaking, it is the necessity of capital to control labor power which has lead to the development of complex managerial and supervisory hierarchies. Capital relentless effort to bring increasingly more of the production process within its grasp is in large part responsible for the contradictory location of semi-autonomous employees. The upgrading and downgrading of skilled associated with various task in the production process can be linked to the struggle between unions and management. Considering class fractions, dual labor market literature illustrates the ways in which the interaction between a capitalist class ready to exploit ethnic and racial antagonisms and unions which played into the hands of capital by accepting firm-specific benefits and the internal restructuring of the firm helped to promote working class segmentation. Conversely, the drive to proletarian commercial labor has meant that the productive/unproductive labor distinction is no longer particularly salient in creating differential interests. Within the capitalist class, the struggle to vertically integrate production has meant that the industrial, commercial and banking fractions which existed under competitive capitalism are no longer as important as they once were. Rather, the monopoly and competitive fractions are more consequential in creating different interests as monopoly capital both dominates new competitive capital, in a sense letting it protect the fringes of monopoly production, and threatens to drive out old competitive capital. The expansion of the welfare functions of the state, promoted by the need to protect the capitalist system itself by insuring minimal within-system benefits to its most exploited has, as illustrated above, created new possibilities for salient within class fractioning.

Once generated the structure of class and segment positions in a social formation, has implications for the ensuing struggles. Having begun with such abstractions as phases of the mode of production, as well as economic, political and ideological relations, we have arrived at a conceptual understanding of the variability of concrete social formations of advanced capitalism. In one such concrete social formation, we developed a structural map of ‘pure’ classes, contradictory class locations, and the most important class fractions and social categories. By attaching the concepts of fundamental and immediate interests to this structural map, we become ready to link it to class struggle.

Since the structural map of the advanced capitalist social formation is so complex, the fundamental antagonism between capital and labor is not made transparent for the working class; or, for anyone else. Rather, the development of contradictory locations serves to blur the issue of transition to socialism. The development of class fractions with objectively different immediate interests impedes not only the structural unity of classes, but their unity in struggle as well. At the same time, it diverts real struggles from organization around fundamental interests to their organization around immediate interests.

With the objective fractioning of the capitalist class creates potentially exploitable weaknesses, a highly segmented working class, in the United States, the overlay of class fractions with differing immediate economic interests, and social categories with their different ideological identifications has been particularly consequential in diverting the real concern of workers to their differing immediate aims. In fact, such working class segmentation is seen by Stanley Aronowitz (1976) to have effectively eradicated any possibility of a unified working class movement in struggle. We have also indicated that workers who are part of institutionalized social categories are particularly prone to identify with these categories, rather than to see themselves as workers with fundamental working class interests. For example, such is the case with soldiers and police.

If working class struggles are to become organized around fundamental rather than immediate interests, if the immediate interests of different segments of capital are to be exploited, and if the contradictory class locations close to the boundary of the working class are to be pulled into the working class struggle, then the actors and organizers of class struggle must understand the existing framework of class and class segments. They must establish which ongoing struggles around immediate interests have the greatest potential for unifying actors around the fundamental issue of transition to socialism. They must, as well, understand what kinds of political mediation are most likely to strike a chord for further unity rather than for further divisiveness. These tasks in turn necessitate detailed analysis of existing struggles and their historical development in the concrete social formation itself.

Selected Bibliography
A. A. Berle dan G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, 1932.
Abendroth, Wolfgang, “Die Soziale Struktur der BRD und ihre Politischen Entwicklungstendenzen”, in Abendroth (hrsg.), Antagonisteische Gesellshcaft und Politische Demokratie, Newwied, 1967.
Adler, Franklin Hugh, “Les Rapports enter le Travileur Noir et le Capitalism
American”, Temps Moderns, Janvier 1969, Numerous 271.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edisi Baru. New York, 1937.
Adam Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society, London, 1967.
Alex Inkeles and P. H. Rossi,”NationalComparisons of occupational Prestige,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXII, No. 4 (1956).
Alfred Willener, Images de la sociaete et classes socials. Bern, 1957.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Editor P. Bradley. New York, 1945.
Alvin Gouldner,”Eine Untersuchung uber administrative Rollen,” dalam KolnerZeitschrift fur soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1956).
A. M. Carr-Saunders dan D. C. Jones, A Survey of the Social Structure of England and Wales, vol-2, Oxford, 1937.
Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis. London, 1938.
A. Moser dan J. R. Hall,”The Social Grading of Occupations,” no. 107
Andrew Ure, The Philosophy of Manufactures. London, 1835.
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, 1957.
-----,“Approaches to the Study of Social Conflict: A Colloqum,” Conflict Resolution, Vol. I. No. 2 (Juni 1957).
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown,“On the Concept of Function in Social Science,” dalam Structure and Function in Primitive Society. London, 1952.
Aronowitz, Stanley, False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness, McGraw-Hill Books, New York, 1973.
Andre Philip, La democratie industrielle, Paris, 1955.
Averitt, Robert, the Dual Economy, Norton, New York, 1968.
Baran, Paul, The Political Economy of Growth, London, 1958.
Backwood, Arbitration and industrial Conflict,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. VI, No. 4 (1955).
Barbier, Rene, “Sociologie des Strates Professionelles: le Capitalism d’Organization Comme Structure Englobante”, L’Homme et la Societe 1972, Numero 24-25.
Beatrice dan Sidney Webb, Industrial Democracy. London, 1913.
Berle, Adolf Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1967 (originally published in 1932 by Macmillan)
Bertrand Russell,”Structure,” dalam Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits. London, 1948.
Bluestone, Barry, “The Tripartite Economy: Labor Markets and the Working Poor”, Poverty and Human Resources Abstracts, July August, 1970.
Boccara, Paul, “Uberakkumulation – Monople – staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus Heute”, Marxismus Digest, 3: 72-90.
Bolbrinker, Claus-Ivar, Klasenanalyse als Organisationsfrage, Grupen Focus Verlag, 1975.
Bon, F. et M. A. Burnier, Classe Ouvriere et Revolution, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1971.
Braverman, Harry, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1974.
Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture ad Other Essays, Chapel Hill, 1944.
Buroway, Michael, The Organization of Consent: Changing Patterns of Conflict on Shop Floor, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1976.
W. Taylor, ”The Principles of Scientific Management,” dalam Scientific Management, New York dan London, 1947.
Calamai, Marco, “ Division du Travail et Technique du Pouvoir”, Temps Modernes Avril, 1970, Numero 285.
Carchedi, G., “Reproduction of Social Classes at the Level of Production Relations”, Economy and Society (4, 3: 369-417), 1975.
Carchedi, G., “On the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class”, Economy and Society (4, 1: 1-85), 1975a.
Carl Brinkmann,”Revolution,” dalam Handworterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. IX. Stuttgart, Tubingen, and Gottingen, 1957.
C. J. Barnard,”The Functions and Pathology of Status Systems in Formal Organizations,”dalam W. F. Whyte, ed., Industry and Society. New York dan London, 1946.
Charles Babbage, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, London, 1832.
Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress. London, 1946.
-----,“Industrieegesellschaft und Tradition,” dalam Verhandlungen des 13. deutschen Soziologentages. Cologne, 1957.
----,“Kapitalismus,” dalam Handworterbuch der sozialwissen-Schaften, Vol. I. Stuttgart, Tubingen, dari Gottingen, 1956.
Carl Jantke,”Vorindustrielle Gesellschaft und Staat,” dalam Arnold Gehlen dan Helmut Schelsky, ed., Soziologie Dusseldorf dan Cologne, 1955.
Clark Kerr,”Industrial Conflict and Its Mediation,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LX, No. 3 (Nov. 1954).
C. W. Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes. New York, 1951.
-----,Class and Society. New York, 1955.
-----, The New Men of Power, New York, 1954.
-----,The Power Elite, New York, 1956.
David Lockwood,”Some Remarks on ‘The Social System,’ British Journal of Sociology, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1956).
D. G. MacRae,”Social Stratification (Bibliography),” Current sociology, Vol. II (1953/54).
Denitch, Bogdan, “La Nouvelle Gauche et la Nouvelle Classe Ouviere”, L’Homme et la Societe, 1970, Numero 16.
Deppe, Frank, Das Bewusstsein der Arbeiter, Koln, Polk Rugenstein Verlag, 1971.
Dobb, Maurice, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, Routledge and Kegen Paul, Ltd., London, 1967.
Domhoff, William, Who Rules America?, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967.
Der Staatsmonopolistische Kapitalismus, Verlag Marsixtische Blaetter, Frankfurt/Main, 1973.
D. V. Glass, ed., Social Mobility in Britain, London, 1954.
D. V. Glass dan J. R. Hall,” Social Mobility in Britain: A Study of Inter-Generation Changes in Status,” dalam no. 107.
David Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker. London, 1958.
Eduard Heimann, Wirtschaftssysteme und Gesellschafts systeme, Tubingen, 1954.
Edwards, Richard C., Michael Reinch and David M. Gordon eds. Labor Market Segmentation, D. C. Health and Company, Lexington, Mass. 1975.
Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization. London, 1949.
Elisabeth Noelle dan E. P. Neumann, Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung, 1945 bis 1955. Allensbach, Emil Lederer dan Jakob Marschak,”Der neue Mittelstand,” in Grundriss der Sozialokonomik, Section IX, bagian I, Tubingen, 1926.
F. A. von der Heydte dan Karl Sacherl, soziologie der deutschen Partein. Munich. 1955.
Freedman, Francesca, “The Internal Structure of American Proletariat: A Marxist Analysis”, Socialist Revolution 26, October-December, 1975.
Friedrich Engels, Die Lage der arbeitenden Kalssen in England. Edisi Berlin, 1952.
Fritz croner, Die Angestellten in der modernen Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M. and Vienna, 1954.
Fritz Sternberg, Kapitalismus und Sozialismus vor dem Weltgericht. Hamburg, 1951.
F. Rosenstiel,”Der amerikanische ‘Volkskapitalismus,’ “ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 11, 1956.
Georges Gurvitch,”Le Dynamisme des classes sociales,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III. London, 1956.
Gerhard Mackenroth dan K. M. Bolte,”Bericht uber das Forschungsvorhaben ‘Wandlungen der deutschen Sozialstruktur (am Beispiel Schleswig-Holstein),’ dalam Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology, Vol. II, London, 1954.
G. E. Lenski,”American Social Classes-Statistical Strata or Social Groups?” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LVIII (1952).
G. D. H. Cole, Studies in Class Structure, London, Gerhard Albrecht, Die Sozialen klassen, Leipzig, 1926.
Glucksman,Andre, “Nous ne Sommes pas Tous Proletaires”, Temps Modernes, 1974, Numeros 330, 331.
G. Thomas,”Labour Mobility in Great Britain 1945-49” (An Inquiry carried out for the Ministry of Labour and National Service), Report No. 134 of the Social Survey, London, tanpa tahun.
Gordon, David M., Theories of Poverty and Underemployment, Heath Books, Lexington Massachusetts, 1972.
Gorz, Andre, “Caracteres de classe de la Science et des Travailleurs Scientifiques”, Temps Modernes, 1974, Numero 330.
Gorz, Andre, Critique de la Division du Travail, Collection Politique, le Seuil Paris, 1973.
Gorz, Andre, Reforme et Revolution, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1969
Gorz, Andre, “Technique, Techniciens et Lutte de Classes”, Temps Modernes, 1971, Numero 301-302.
Gottschlach, Wilfried, Structurveranderungen der Gesellschaft und Politishes Handeln in der Lehre von Hilferding, Berlin, 1962.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, 1951.
Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics. London dan New Haven, 1934.
Harold Lasswell, politics-Who gets What, When, and How? New York, 1936.
Hargraveas Parkinson, Ownership of Industry. London, 1951.
Harrington, Michael, “Old Working Class, New Working Class”, Dissent, Winter, 1962.
Helmut Schelsky, Soziologische Bemerkungen zur Rolle der Schule in unserer Gesellschaftsverfassung. Tidak diterbitkan (1956).
Helmut Schelsky,”Die Jugend der industriellen Gesellschaft und die Arbeitslosigkeit,” dalam Arbeitslosigkeit und Berufsmot der Jugend, Vol. II. Cologne, 1952.
Henri Fayol, Administration industrielle et generale, Paris, 1916.
Heinz B Kluth,”Arbeiterjugend-Begriff und Hilde T. Himmelweit,”Social Status and Secondary Education since the 1944 Act: Some Data for London,” dalam no. 107.
Heinz Markmann,”Sozialstruktur im Allgemeinen,” dalam Alfred Weber, ed., Einfuhrung in die Soziologie, Munich, 1955.
Heinrich Popitz, ”Zum Begriff der Klassesngesellschaft,” in H.D Ortlieb, ed., Hamburger Jahrbuch fur wirtschafts und Gesellchaftspolitik, Vol. III. Tubingen, 1958.
Helmut Schelsky,”Gesellschaftlicher Wandel,” Offene Wels, No. 41 (1956).
Helmut Schelsky, Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwarth. Edisi ke-3. Stuttgart, 1955.
Helmut Schelsky, ”Die Bedeutung des Schichtungsbegriffers fur die Analyse der gegenwattigen deutschen Gesellschaft,” dalam Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology, Vol. I. London, 1954.
Hess, Peter, “Monopol, Rationalitat und Gleichgewichtiges Wachstam”, Marxismus Digest, 3: 52-71, 1971.
H. H. Girth dan C. W. Mill,“A Marx for the Managers,” dalam no. 136.
Heinrich Popitz, H. P. Bahrdt, E. A. Jueres, dan H. Kesting, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters, Tubinge, 1957.
Hilferding, Rudolf, Das Finanzkapital, Frankfurt/Main: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1973.
H. L Sheppard,”Approaches to Conflict in American Industrial Sociaology,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. V, No. 4 (1954).
H. P. Bahrdt, Industrieburukratie: Versuch einer Soziologie des industrialisierten Burobetriebes und seiner Angestellten, Stuttgart, 1958.
. W. Pfautz,”The Current Literature on Social Stratification: Critique and Bibliography,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LVIII (1952).
Israel, Joachim, “Remarques sur Quelques Problemes de la Theorie Marxiste de Classes”, L’Homme et la Societe, 1970, Numero 15.
International Sociological Association, The Nature of Conflict, Dengan penyumbang J. Bernard, T. H. Pear, R. Aron, dan R. C. Angell, Paris, UNESCO, 1957.
J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, 1943.
J. A. Schumpeter,”Das soziale Antlitz des Deutschen Reiches” (1929), dalam Aufsatze zur Soziologie, Tubingen, 1953.
J. A. Schumpeter,”Die sozialen Klassen im ethnisch homogen Milieu” (1927), in Aufsatze zur Soziologi :Tubingen, 1953.
Jean E. Floud,”The Educational Experience of the Adult Population of England and Wales as at July 1949,” dalam no. 107.
J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. London, 1952.
Japan Sociological Society, Social Mobility in Japan. Mimeograp untuk Third World Congress of Sociology (1956).
James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution. New York, 1944.
Jervis, Giovanni et Letizia Comba, “Contradictions des Technicians et de la Culture Techniste”, Temps Modernes, 1970, Numero 285.
John Bowlby,’A Psychoanalitic View of Conflict and its Regulation” (mimeo.), Center for Advanced Study, 1958.
Johnston, Stephen, “How the West was Won: Last Shootout for the Yankee-Cowboy Thesis”, Insurgent Sociologist, Winter 1976.
John Milar, An Historical View of the English Government, London, 1787.
Jung, Heinz, “Zur Diskussion umden Inhalt des Begriffs ‘Arbeiter-Klasse’ und zu Strukturveranderungen in der westdeutschen Arbeiterklasse”, Das Argument 12/9-10: 665-698, 1971.
Jurgen Kuczynski, Die Geschichte der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1789 bis in die Gegenwart, Edisi ke-6. berlin, 1954.
J. S. Coleman, Community Conflict, Glencoe, 1957.
J. R. Hall dan D. C. Jones,”The Social Grading of Occupations,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. I (1950).
J. R. Hall dan D. V. Glass,”Education and Social Mobility,” dalam no. 107.
J. R. Hall W. Ziegel,” A Comparison of Social Mobility Data for England and Wales, Italy, Frace, and the U. S. A.” dalam no. 107.
Joseph Ben-David,”The Rise of a salaried Professional Class in Israel,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III. London, 1956.
Kathe Bauer-Mendeiberg, “Stand und Klasse,” Koelner Vierteljahreshelfte fur Soziologie, Vol. III, No. 4 (1924).
Karl Marx, Nationalokonomie und Philosophie, Editor E. Their, Cologne dan Berlin, 1950.
-----,Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik. In Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Section I, Vol. III. Berlin, 1932.
-----,“Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritic\sche Moral,” dalam Franz Mehring, ed., Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, edisi ke-3, Stuttgart, 1920.
-----,Das Elend der Philosophie, Edisi baru, Berlin, 1947.
-----,Zur Kritik der Politischen Okonomie, Edisi, Berlin 1947.
-----,Der 18. Brumaire Der Louis Bonaparte, Edisi, Berlin, 1946.
-----,Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich, Edisi, Berlin, 1951.
-----,Letter to Bolte (November 1871), dalam Zur Kritik des Gothaer Programms, Edisi, Berlin, 1946.
-----,“Zirkularbrief” to Bebel and others (September 1879), dalam Zur Kritik des Gothaer Programms, Edisi, Berlin, 1946.
-----,Das Kapital, Edisi. Berlin, 1953.
-----,Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, Edisi, Berlin, 1953.
Karl Marx dan Friedrich Engels, “Die deutsche Ideologie,” dalam Zsiegfried Landshut, ed., Der historische Materialismus, Stuttgart, 1953.
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. London, 1947.
Karl Renner, Mensch und Gessellschaft: Grundriss einer Soziologie, Vienna, 1952.
Karl Renner, Die Wirtschaft als Gesamtprozess und die Sozialisierung, Berlin, 1924.
K. B. Mayer,” The Theory of Social Classes,” dalam Transactions of the Second World congress of Sociology, Vol. II. London, 1954.
Kingsley Davis dan W. E. Moore,”sOME Principles of Stratification,” in Logan Wilson dan W. L. Kolb, Sociological Analysis, New York, 1949.
Kingsley Davis, Human Society. New York, 1949.
K. M. Bolte,”Ein Beitrag zur Problematik der sozialen Mobolitat,” Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1956).
-----,Sozialer Aufstieg und Abstieg, Eine Untersuchung uber Berufsprestige und Berufsmobilitat. Suttgart, 1959.
-----,“Some Aspects of Social Mobility in Western Germany,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III. London, 1956.
-----,The Open Society and its Enemies. Edisi ke-2 (baru). London, 1952.
Kardeij, Edward, “La Bureaucratie est-elle une Classe?” La Nouvelle Critique, 1969, Numero 23.
Larner, Robert J., Managment Capital and the Large Corporation, Univesity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970.
Lewis Corey, The Crisis of the Middle Class. New York, 1935.
Levebvre, Henri, “LA Classe Ouvriere est-elle Revolutionnaire”, L’Homme et La Societe. 1971, Numero 21.
Levine, Joel H., “The Sphere of Influence”, American Sociological Review 37:14-27, 1972.
Lieberson, Stanley, “An Empirical Study of Military Industrial Linkages”, American Journal of Sociology, 76: 562-580, 1971.
Loren, Charles, Classes in the United States: Workers Against Capitalists, Cardinal Publishers, Davis, California, 1977.
Llewelyn Gross,”The use of Class Concepts in Sociological Research,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LIV (1949).
L. A. Coser,”Social Conflict and Social Change,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol.VII, No. 3 (September 1957).
Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklarung. Amsterdam, 1947.
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, 1930.
Max Weber,”Der Sozialismus,” in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur soziologie und Sozial politik. Tubingen, 1924.
MacPherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possesive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962.
Maignien, Vannick, La Division du Travail Manuel et Intellectuel, Editions Maspero, Paris, 1963.
Mandel, Ernest, Marxist Economy Theory, Methuen Press, 2 vols, London, 1968.
Mandel, Ernest, Der Spactkapitalismus, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1973.
Marglin, Stephen A., “What do Bosses do?” The Review Of Radical Political Economics, 1974.
Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.
Molnar, Ferene, Economic Growth and Recessions in the U.S.A. Akadmie Kiado, Budapest, 1970.
Moore, Barrinton, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966.
M. J. Levy,”Some Sources of the Vulnerability of the Structures of Relatively Non-Industrialized Societies to Those of Highly Industrialized Societies,” dalam B. F. Hostelitz, ed., The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas. Chicago, 1952.
Michel Crozier,”Le Role des employes et des petits fonctionnaires dans la structure sociale franqaise contemporaine,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III. London, 1956.
Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the communist System, New York, 1957.
Morris Janowitz,”Some Consequences Social Mobility in the Unites States,” Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III. London, 1956.
Ministry of Labour and National Service, Industrial Relations Handbook. London, 1953.
Ministry of Labour and National Service, Industrial Relations Handbook. London, 1953.
M. M. Gordon,”Social Class in American Sociaety,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LV (1950).
National Opinion Research Center,”Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation,” dalam no. 35.
National Resources Committee,”The Structure of Controls,” dalam no. 35.
Natalie Rogoff, Recent Trends in Occupational mobility, Glencoe, 1953.
Naville, Pierre, “Modeles Historiques et Modification de la Structure de la Classe Ouvriere”, L’Homme et la Societe, Juillet 1971, Numero 21.
Nicolaus, Martin, “Proletariat and Middle Classes in Marx: Hegelian Choreography and the Cpaitalist Dialectic”, Studies on the Left, Vol. 6, Number 1, 1967.
O. C. Cox,”Estates, Social Classes and Political Classes,” American Sociological Review, Vol.X (1945).
O’Connor, James, The Fiscal Crisis of The State, St. Martin Press, New York, 1973.
O’Connor, James, “Productive and Unproductive Labor”, Politics and Society Vol. 5, Number 3, 1975.
Oscar Glantz,” Class Consciousness and Political Solidarity,” dalam American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 1958.
Ogelsby, Carl, “Yankees vs. Cowboys”, Part One, Two, and Three, Guardian 20, April 13, 20, and 27.
Othmar Spann,”Klasse und stand,” in Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, Vol. V. Edisi ke-4. 1923.
Panzieri, Raniero, “Ueber die Kapitalistische Anwndung der Maschinherie im Spaetkapitalismus” (1961) and “Mehrwetr und Plannung”, (1964) in Pozzoli, C. (hrsg.), Spaetkapitalismus un Klassenkampf: Eine Auswahl aus den Quaderni Rossi, Frankfurt/Main: EVA, 1972.
Paul Mombert,”zum Wessen der sozialen Klasse, dalam Hauptproblems der soziologie : Erinnerungsgabe fur Max Weber, Munich, 1923.
Paul Sering, Jeinseits des kapitalismus. Nurnberg, 1947.
Pederson, Lawrence and William Tabb, “Ownership and Control of Larged Corporations Revisited”, Antitrust Bulletin, 1976.
P. F. Drucker, The new Society: The anatomy of the Industrilal Order, New York, 1950.
P. J. Proudhon, Systeme des contradictions economiques, ou Philosopie de la misere. Edisi ke-3. Paris, 1867.
Peter Gay, Das Dilemma des demokratischen Sozialismus, Nurnberg, 1954. (Translated from The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, New York, 1952).
Pitirim Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories. New York, 1928.
-----,The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Diterjemahkan oleh A. M. Henderson dan Talcott Parsons, New York, 1950.
-----,Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Grunriss der Sozialokonomik, section III). Edisi ke-4.
P. N. Fedoseyev,”Laws of Social Changes in the Twentieth Century,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. VIII. London, 1957.
Poulantzas, Nicos, Political Power and Social Classes, New Left Books, London, 1973a.
Poulantzas, Nicos, Faschismus und Diktatur, Trikont Verlag, Hamburg, 1973b.
Poulantzas, Nicos, “On Social Classes”, New Left Review, 78:27-54, mArch-April, 1973c.
Poulantzas, Nicos, Classes in Contemporary Cpaitalism, New Left Books, London, 1975.
Przeworski, Adam, “The Process of Class Formation”, Mimeo, University of Chicago, November, 1976.
Quaderni Rossi, “Die Arbeiterbewegung und die Autonomie des Klassenkampfes”, in Pozzoli, C. (hsrg.) Spaetkapitalismus und Klassenkampf: Eine Auswahl aus der Quaderni Rossi, Frankfurt/Main:EVA, 1972.
Ralf Dahrendorf,”Gibt es noch Klasses? Die Begriffe der sozialen Schict’ und ‘sozialen lasse’ in der Sozialanalyse der Gegenwart,” Annoles Universitatis Saraviensis, Section Philosophie, Vol. II. No. 4 (1954).
-----,“Klassesnstruktur und Klassesnkonflikt in der entwickelten Industriegesellschaft”, Die neue Gesellschaft, Vol. II, No. 4 (1954).
-----,“Social Structure, Class Interests and Social Conflict,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress Of Sociology, Vol. III. London, 1956.
Ralf Dahrendorf,”Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,” Conflict Resolution, Vol. II, No. 2 (juni 1958).
Ralf Dahrendorf,”Die soziale Funktion der Erziehung in der industriellen Gesellschaft,” Speculum: Saarlandische Studentenzeitschrift, Vol. I, No. 7 (1956).Raymond Aron,”Social Structure and the Ruling Class,” dalam no. 35.
Ralf Dahrendorf,”Industrielle Fertigkeiten und soziale Schichtung,” Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1956).
Ralf Dahrendorf,”Unskilled Labour in British Industry. Tesis doctor. London, 1956.
Ralf Dahrendorf,”Struktur und Funktion. Talcott Parsons und die Entwicklung der soziologischen Theorie,” Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. XII, No. 4 (1955).
-----,“Out of Utopia: Towards a Re-Orientation of Sociological Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXIV, No. 2 (September 1958).
Ralf Dahrendorf, Marx in Perspektive: Die Idee des Gerechten im Denken von Karl Marx. Hannover, 1953.
-----,“Philosophie und Soziologie bei Karl Marx: Marx Kritik und ihre Bedeutung,” Geist und Tat, Vol. X, No. 3 (1955).
Ramakrishna Mukherjee,”A Study of Social Mobility Between Three Generations,” dalam no. 107.
Reinhard Bendix,”Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power,” dalam no. 136.
Reinhard Bendix dan S. M. Lipset, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, Berkeley dan London, 1958.
Reinhard Bendix dan S. M. Lipset,”Political Sociology,” Current Sociology, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1957).
Reich, Michael et al, “A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation”, American Economic Review Vol. 63, Number 2: 359-365, May, 1973.
R. M. Maclver,The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry into Race Relations in Africa. Editor P. M. Kaberry, New Haven, 1945.
Reinhard Bendix dan S. M. Lipset, ed., Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification. Glencoe, 1953.
Reinhard Bendix, Work dan Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization, New York dan London, 1956.
Reinhard Bendix dan S. M. Lipset,’Karl Marz’s Theory of social Classes,” dalam no. 35.
R. H. Tawyen, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. London, 1926.
Rey, Pierre-Philippe, Les Alliances de Classes, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1973.
Richard Centers, The Psycology of Social Classes, Princeton, 1949.
Robert Michels,”Beitrag zur Lehre von der Klassenbildung,” Archio fur Sozialwissenschaft, Vol. XLIX (1920).
Robert Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Democratie. Edisi ke-2. Stuttgart, 1925.
Roy Lewis dan Angus Maude, The English Middle Classes. London, 1949.
R. K. Merton, A. P. Gray, B. Hockey, dan H. C. Selvin, ed., Reader in Bureaucracy. Glencoe, 1952.
R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Edisi ke-2. Glencoe, 1957.
R. K. Merton dan P. F. Lazarsfeld, Continuities in Social Research. Glencoe, 1950.
Siegfried Landshut,”Die Gegenwart im Lichte der Marxschen Lehre,” dalam H. D. Ortlieb, ed., Hamburger Jahrbuch fur Wirtschafts-und Gesellschaftspolitik, Vol. I. Tubingen, 1956.
S. M. Lipset dan Reinhard bendix,” Social Status and Social Structure,” British journal of Sociology, Vol. II (1951).
S. M. Lipset dan H. L. Zetterberg,”A Theory of Social Mobility,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. II, London, 1956.
Stanislaw Ossowski,”Old Notions and New Problems: Interpretations of Social Structure in Modern Society,” dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III. London, 1956.
Stanislaw Ossowski,”La Vision dichotomique de la stratification sociale,” Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie, Vol. XX (1956).
Talcott Parsons,”Social Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory,” dalam Essays in Sociological Theory, Edisi Baru Glencoe, 1954.
Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action. Edisi ke-2. Glencoe, 1949.
Talcott Parsons,”The Distribution of Power in American Society,” World Politics, Vol. X, No. 1 (Oktober 1957).
Theodor Geigerr, Die Soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes, Stuttgart, 1932.
Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the leisure Class, New York, 1899.
T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society, London, 1955.
Theodor Geiger, “Zur Theorie des Klassenbegriffs und der proletarischen Klasse,” dalam Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. LIV (1930).
Theodor Geiger, Die Klassengesellschaft im Schmelztiegel. Cologne and Hagen, 1949.
T. H. Marshall, ed., Class Conflict and Social Stratification, London, 1938.
T. H. Marshall,”A Note on ‘Status,” dalam K. M. Kapadia, ed., Profesor Ghurye Felicitation Volume, Bombay, 1954.
-----,“General Survey of Changes in Social Stratification in the Twentieth Century,” in Transcation of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. III, London, 1956.
Theodor Eschenburg, Herrschaft der Verbade? Stuttgart, 1955.
Theodore Caplow, The Sociology of Work. Minneapolis, 1954.
Theo Pirker, Siegfried Braun, dkk., Arbeiter, Management, Mitbestimmung. Stuttgart and Dusseldorf, 1955.
Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie, diterjemahkan dan diedit oleh C. Brinkmann, Tubingen, 1955.
V. S. Nemchinov, Changes in the Class Structure of the Population of the Soviet Union, Memeograp untuk Third World Congress of Sociology (1956).
-----,“Changes in the Class Structure of the Population of the Soviet Union”, dalam Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. VIII. London, 1957.
Werner Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus. Edisi ke-4, Munich dan Leipzig, 1921.
W. L. Warner, Social Class in America, Chicago, 1949.
-----,The functions of Social Conflict, London, 1956.
W. L. Warner dan P. S. Lunt, The Social Life in a Modern Community, New Haven, 1941.
W. E. Moore, Industrial Relations and the Social Order, New York, 1947.
W. H. Scott, Industrial Democracy : A Revolution. Liverpool, 1955.
Werner Sombart, “The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory in Sociology,” in Essays in Sociological Theory. Edisi Baru. Glencoe, 1954